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1 Introduction 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a multi-ethnic state comprised by 56 
officially recognized nationalities, while its minority languages number in the 
hundreds (Poa & Lapolla 2007: 337). One of these nationalities are the Zhuang 壮, a 
Tai-Kadai speaking people living in the south of the country, near the border of 
Vietnam. The Zhuang are sometimes listed as one of the ethnic groups whose 
language is one of the most well maintained in the country (Sun 2010: 23; Huang 
2016: 61). In this thesis, I intend to bring this claim under questioning, however, as 
my hypothesis is that although on the level of legislation Zhuang is well protected, in 
practice it is facing many of the same language maintenance problems as the 
numerous threatened and endangered languages of China. My research question is 
whether there are signs of language shift among the “young” generations of Zhuang 
born in the 1980s or later. 
As China rises on the international stage, the importance laid upon national unity and 
the growth of Chinese nationalist sentiments have become an internationally noted 
trend. Language campaigns aiming at spreading standard Mandarin or Putonghua are 
taking place, some say at the cost of local dialects and languages. Minority language 
maintenance seems to have been deemed low-priority and in some cases even 
actively stifled, often on the pretence of maintaining national unity and fighting 
separatism. Language shift to Chinese has been reported among even the relatively 
well-off minorities, such as the Koreans, often due to institutional causes.1 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is very sensitive about activism related to 
ethnic minorities, especially the ones that have a recent history of statehood, such as 
the Tibetans, Uyghurs or Mongols. However, this thesis will concentrate on the 
Zhuang, who do not have such a background. For most of their history the Zhuang 
have lived in scattered communities, unable to unify as a nation state, and therefore 
have not formed a threat to Chinese political power. I believe, however, that 
language-wise they still do not fare much better than the others. 
                                                 
1 See The Diplomat 9.6.2016: How Beijing Turned Koreans Into Chinese 
(http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/how-beijing-turned-koreans-into-chinese/) 
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The Zhuang are the largest ethnic minority in China, and thus should not be ignored 
when studying the country’s minority (language) policies. For years, the Zhuang 
were thought to be practically Chinese, and did not attract much attention from 
western scholars. Most Zhuang-related studies have therefore been done by Zhuang 
and Chinese researchers and written in Chinese. The Zhuang seem to enjoy quite a 
good position in society by ethnic minority standards: they have their own 
autonomous region, their language has been granted many legal rights, and they 
seem quite well integrated into Chinese society. Still, anecdotes of Zhuang children 
not being able to speak their mother tongue keep appearing. 
If the Zhuang were facing language shift, it would be significant on the scale of the 
entire PRC and all its minority languages. It would show that not even the largest and 
most well-maintained (or so it is thought) minority languages in the country are able 
maintain their language perfectly and resist the spread of Putonghua in the current 
situation. Logically then, it could be assumed that many of the smaller and less well-
recognized languages in the country may be facing even greater maintenance 
problems. 
Why is this important then? Among other, perhaps more obvious reasons, minority 
issues are a key building block in state stability. This has been pointed out for 
instance in the case of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The USSR language 
policy was considered to be one of the most politically driven in the world, but 
nevertheless, during the Soviet collapse and dissolution, minority language issues 
and the problems that had accumulated during the years were amongst the most 
debated.2  
In the heydays of the Soviet Union, China copied Stalin’s system for defining 
nationalities, i.e. the four commons (a common language, common territory, 
common economic life and common culture), and used it to categorize the vast 
masses of people living in the country. Chinese minority policy has been lauded as 
more successful than the Soviet one, however, and it has been named as one of the 
reasons why the PRC avoided the fate of the Soviet Union. The PRC clearly 
recognized the weight of minority issues early on, since most of its borders are lined 
                                                 
2 See Konstantin Zamyatin 2014: An Official Status for Minority Languages? – A study of state 
languages in Russia’s Finno-Ugric Republics. University of Helsinki. 
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with autonomous minority areas. Even so, minority issues are still labelled as highly 
sensitive today, and targeted by censorship on the Chinese internet. There were 
initially over 400 groups applying for nationality status in the first years of the 
People’s Democracy of China, and only 56 have been recognized so far, which could 
be one factor contributing to the tension (Kaup 2000: 73–74). 
Since the 1990s, the direction of Chinese minority policy seems to have become 
stricter, shifting towards ‘unity in homogeneity’ rather than ‘unity in variety’. 
Minority language schooling has since been decreasing, minority autonomy has been 
put under the supervision of Han Chinese CCP secretaries, and language activists 
have been arrested for subversion of state power.3 Since the 2000s, Han Chinese 
linguistic minorities, which speak so called “dialects”, are also feeling the effects of 
campaigns such as “Spread Mandarin and Abolish Cantonese” (tuī pǔ fèi yuè 推普废
粤) in Guangdong province. All this could be expected to increase friction between 
the PRC government and its non-Mandarin speaking citizens, and make China a 
more hostile environment for minority languages. 
As one extreme example, Uyghur language education has been all but curbed in 
many schools in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region during the 21th century, 
as Uyghur language schooling is being replaced by Standard Mandarin even on the 
pre-school level, officially as a solution to employment problems (Ma 2012: 40, 43). 
In the case of the Zhuang, this kind of transition to Standard Mandarin education has 
been described as voluntary, as many parents neglect their mother tongue and urge 
their children to study Mandarin to get a good job. One should ask, however, how 
voluntary can such a decision be, if one finds himself living in a society where 
speaking Mandarin is the only option. 
In addition to inducing political stability, there is also an intrinsic value to inclusive 
minority language policies, as they can help preserve the languages involved. 
Language is a vessel of a people’s history and culture, and it can even influence the 
way we think. It is an often-cited cliché that in order to understand a culture, one 
must first understand its language. On a completely opposite note, it is also said that 
                                                 
3 See The New York Times 31.8.2016: Police in China Push for Trial of Tibetan Education Advocate. 
(https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/world/asia/china-tibet-tashi-wangchuk.html) 
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to destroy a people, one must first destroy their language. A language harbours a way 
of thinking, and once lost, it can rarely be brought back to life again. Language is so 
central to who we are, that linguistic rights are even listed in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. One could even argue that languages should be listed 
as intangible cultural heritage! 
One often hears that a state needs a common tongue to function, and how great it 
would be if we all spoke the same language. There is no denying the favourable 
aspects of such a world. However, the people stating such an argument often forget 
that most people in the world are actually already multilingual. Speakers of non-
dominant languages often have no choice but to learn other languages than their 
mother tongue just to survive, and they don’t necessarily have to go to university to 
do that. The human brain has evolved to work with language. That is what makes us 
unique. We are hard-wired to learn languages starting from early childhood. Most 
people learn languages informally, without even thinking about it, while others study 
languages formally at school. Nevertheless, the end result is similar. People are born 
to learn languages and therefore it would be a mistake to think we should all only 
learn one language. Multilingualism can be supported with inclusive minority 
policies, such as a bilingual education system, where both the minority language and 
the dominant language are acquired. This would give linguistic minorities a slightly 
more equal start in life in relation to the majority. 
This finally brings us back to the topic in question of this thesis. Bilingual Zhuang-
Han education has become increasingly rare in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region in recent decades, and I have heard and read scattered reports of young 
Zhuang not being able to speak their mother tongues any more. As mentioned above, 
I discovered that lots of research has been made on the language education of 
Zhuang and other ethnic minorities, but very little has been written on Zhuang 
sociolinguistics, which prompted me to select this field as the topic of this thesis. 
The fact that the Zhuang have been recognized at all by researchers can be attributed 
to the efforts of the forefather of Zhuang studies, Vangz Yenfanh (1899-1982, 
Chinese name Huang Xianfan 黄现璠), who published many ground-breaking 
histories, such as “A Brief History of the Zhuang of Guangxi” (Guǎngxī Zhuàngzú 
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Jiǎnshǐ 广西壮族简史, 1957), “Nungz Ciqgau” (Nóng Zhìgāo 侬智高, 1983) and “The 
Comprehensive History of the Zhuang” (Zhuàngzú Tōngshǐ 壮族通史, 1988). Mister 
Vangz’s works undoubtedly raised the profile of the Zhuang people both in the eyes 
of the domestic and the international community, enabling academics of various 
fields to conduct research related to the people and language. However, as mentioned 
above, Zhuang sociolinguistics are yet to be studied widely, as research related to the 
field seems to have started appearing only as recently as in the late 2000s and early 
2010s (see for example Qin & Sun 2008, Bodomo 2010, Deng 2012) . 
In this study I aim to provide a preliminary review on the issue of Zhuang language 
vitality among young adults by the means of a small-scale sociolinguistic survey 
based on the ELDIA European Language Vitality Barometer questionnaire. In 
chapter two, I will introduce the essential theory related to minority language vitality 
and revitalization. In chapter three, previous research relevant to the language 
situation of the PRC, and more specifically the Zhuang, will be introduced. In 
chapter four, the methodology of this study will be explained, while in chapter five, 
the data and results will be analysed. The results are then further discussed in chapter 
six, and conclusions are finally made in chapter seven. 
1.1 A few words on terminology and other technicalities 
In this thesis, I will discuss issues related to the group of Tai languages commonly 
known as “the Zhuang language”. However, as “the Zhuang language” is actually 
composed of several different languages, it poses a certain terminological problem. 
In my case, I have solved that problem by referring to the Zhuang macrolanguage 
(which includes all variants of Zhuang, including Standard Zhuang) in the indefinite 
form as “Zhuang language”. Single variants of Zhuang are referred to with their 
respective nomenclature. 
What is commonly referred to as “Chinese”, I refer to as “Han language”, which 
encompasses all the different Sinitic languages and dialects often labelled under this 
title. This contrasts with “Standard Mandarin” or “Putonghua”, which I use to 
specifically refer to the Standard variant of Mandarin Chinese based on the Beijing 
dialect and used as the national language of the PRC. 
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Putonghua words or names are given in the pīnyīn romanization, and in a few cases, 
also Chinese logograms (Hànzì) are provided if relevant. The Chinese logograms are 
given in the simplified form currently used in the PRC, as the topic of this thesis 
mainly concentrates on phenomena taking place in that specific country. Zhuang 
words or names are given in the sawcuengh script of Standard Zhuang. 
2 Theory 
In this chapter, I will introduce the main theoretical framework relevant to this study, 
surrounding mainly the issues of language endangerment, language maintenance and 
language shift. These three phenomena form the focus of this thesis, and their 
definitions, causes and processes will be examined below, along with other essential 
topics and terminology.  
2.1 Language or dialect? 
Before discussing language endangerment, it would be wise to first define what 
constitutes a language, and what is a dialect. As a core concept of linguistics, it may 
not be a surprise that there is some disagreement over what these terms mean. In 
relation to each other, human languages, however, are usually divided into two 
categories, as introduced by Heinz Kloss in 1967. First, there are the 
abstandsprachen, or “distance languages”, which are clearly recognizable as separate 
languages by their distinctness from any other language, which is the case for 
example with any isolate language in the world. Second, there are the 
ausbausprachen, or “constructed languages”, which from a linguistic point of view 
might be considered dialects, but have become standardized languages due to 
political action. Therefore, ausbausprachen may be intelligible to speakers of other 
ausbausprachen, such as in the case of Czech and Slovak, or Norwegian and Danish, 
which are part of the West Slavic and Scandinavian dialect continuums. In linguistic 
terms, ausbausprachen do not necessarily constitute separate languages, since they 
are merely political constructs. (Trudgill 2006: 647). 
Dialects are usually thought to be “non-standard” variants of a certain language. 
When distinguishing a language from a dialect, the general linguistic criterion is 
mutual intelligibility: if speakers of two language varieties are able to converse with 
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each other, then it’s a question of dialects; if not, then it’s a question of languages 
(Mesthrie 2006: 474). In actuality this is not always the case, however. Dialects may 
form continuums, where variants are intelligible only to the dialects located next to 
them in the continuum, meaning that variants located in the opposite ends of this 
dialect chain are mutually unintelligible, but may still be considered technically the 
same language (Edwards 2013: 9). In other cases, dialects of one language may be 
unintelligible, but still connected to each other through a shared standard variant, 
identity or literature (Ethnologue 2016b). 
At this point, it becomes clear that in actuality, the distinction between a dialect and a 
language is often a political endeavor more concerned with state-building aspirations 
than linguistics. In Europe, this phenomenon has been witnessed dozens of times, 
perhaps most recently, for example, in the divisions of the Czechoslovak and Serbo-
Croatian languages (Edwards 2013: 9–10). The resulting Czech, Slovak, Serbian and 
Croatian languages (as well as Bosnian and Montenegrin) are all examples of the 
aforementioned ausbau languages, that have been created through conscious political 
effort. 
In China, the language/dialect question is also influenced by political concerns. 
Officially, “Chinese” is thought to be a single language called Hànyǔ 汉语 (“the 
language of the Han people”), made up of numerous dialects (fāngyán 方言). 
However, many of these “dialects” are mutually unintelligible, but since they are 
spoken by the Han ethnicity, according to the official logic, they must be part of the 
same language (see Background chapter for more details). However, outsiders often 
divide “Chinese” into at least seven languages: Mandarin, Wu, Min, Cantonese, 
Hakka, Gan and Xiang (Bradley 2006: 319). Also, the term usually considered to be 
equivalent to “dialect”, fāngyán, complicates the situation further. Fāngyán directly 
translates into local-speech and is actually not semantically equivalent to the term 
dialect. Historically, and sometimes even nowadays, fāngyán has been used to refer 
to any language or dialect, Sinitic or otherwise, that is different from the standard 
variant of Chinese of that time. Therefore, the term fāngyán should be translated as 
topolect instead of dialect. (Mair 1991: 4). The logic of grouping together several 
related languages under the title of a single language, and the generally unclear 
division of “dialect” and “language”, could on their behalf be contributing to 
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language endangerment in China, since non-standard variants may be considered less 
prestigious than the standard language and therefore more expendable. 
2.2 Language endangerment 
Language endangerment means the situation where a language is heading towards 
extinction, which happens when its speakers stop using it. If a language is not 
documented before this happens, it can never be revived again. Language 
endangerment is caused by both external and internal forces. External forces include 
military, economic, religious, cultural and educational subjugation, while internal 
forces mainly refer to the speakers’ own negative attitudes towards their language. In 
order to survive, endangered languages need a meaningful role in the host society, 
preferably on all three levels of community, nation and the international setting. 
(UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages 20034: 2). 
In recent decades, language endangerment and revitalization have become a popular 
topic among linguists and minority language speakers alike. This is due to many 
reasons, some of which are related to globalization and increased consciousness 
towards the rights of minorities. Another reason may be that language extinction is 
now happening perhaps faster than ever, meaning that up to 90 percent of the roughly 
6800 languages spoken in the world today may go extinct during the 21st century 
(UNESCO 2003: 2; Grenoble 2006: 137). From the point of view of linguistics, the 
diversity of human culture, and the speakers of the endangered languages 
themselves, this is of grave concern. 
Before possible revitalization efforts for a language are undertaken, the vitality of the 
language in question should be assessed. The UNESCO Ad Hoc Group on 
Endangered Languages has defined nine factors crucial to language vitality 
(UNESCO 2003: 7–17):  
1. Intergenerational language transmission 
2. Absolute number of speakers 
3. Proportion of speakers within the total population 
4. Trends in existing language domains 
5. Response to new domains and media 
                                                 
4 Referred to as UNESCO 2003 below. 
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6. Materials for language education and literacy 
7. Governmental and institutional language policies, including official status and use 
8. Community members’ attitudes toward their own language 
9. Amount and quality of documentation. (UNESCO 2003: 7–17). 
These factors need to be considered in conjunction with each other. If one only looks 
at the total population of China’s Zhuang minority for example, one may think that 
the language should have no problem surviving in the future. But when one considers 
the different factors in conjunction, it can be seen that the Zhuang are surrounded by 
an increasingly Mandarin speaking society of hundreds of millions of people. And if 
one looks even closer, one notices that there is actually not just one Zhuang 
language, but several, some of which are quite small on the scale of the PRC. 
Therefore, the Zhuang languages may not be as vital as initially thought. 
The single most important factor contributing to language endangerment is the 
interruption of intergenerational language transmission, that is, when most children 
of a language community no longer learn the language from their parents (Grenoble 
& Whaley 2006: 6). Another factor whose importance is often stressed is the range of 
domains of language use. The most important domain is education, since language 
use in education also determines language use in other domains. If only the dominant 
language is used in education, the use of non-dominant languages in other domains 
will decline as well (Grenoble & Whaley 2006: 8–10). A local language does not 
have to dominate all domains to survive, a system of diglossia can suffice. That is 
when the local language is used in certain fixed domains and the majority language is 
used in others. However, bilingualism without diglossia, for example when the home 
is not strictly restricted for only local language use, is never long-lasting and will 
result in language shift and language endangerment (Fishman 1989: 187–188). 
Language attitudes are also vital for the preservation and revitalization of a language, 
and should be assessed on three levels: governmentally, among the majority, and 
among the minority. Language revitalization almost always involves improving 
community attitudes about the endangered language (Grenoble & Whaley 2016: 14). 
The attitudes of the government and the majority can affect those of the minorities 
themselves. Positive attitudes are a prerequisite for the successful revitalization of a 
language.  
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Grenoble & Whaley (2006: 18) offer a six-way scheme for categorizing languages 
with respect to endangerment: 
Safe: [--] all generations use the language in all or nearly all domains. [--] large speaker 
base relative to others spoken in the same region and typically functions as the language 
of government, education and commerce. Many safe languages enjoy official status 
within nation-sates, and as such tend to be held in higher prestige than other languages. 
At Risk: [--] vital [--] without any observable pattern of a shrinking speaker base, but 
lacks some of the properties of a safe language. For example, it is spoken in a limited 
number of domains or has a smaller number of speakers than other languages in the 
same region. 
Disappearing: [--] observable shift towards another language in the communities where 
it is spoken. With an overall decreasing proportion of intergenerational transfer, the 
speaker base sinks because it is not being replenished. [--] a more restricted set of 
domains, and a language of wider communication begins to replace it in a greater 
percentage of homes. 
Moribund: A moribund language is one that is not transmitted to children. 
Nearly extinct: A language can be considered nearly extinct when only a handful of 
speakers of the oldest generation remains. 
Extinct: An extinct language is one with no remaining speakers. (Grenoble & Whaley 
2006: 18). 
This study uses a questionnaire tool-kit developed by the European Language 
Diversity for All (ELDIA) project, which uses a slightly different scale for assessing 
language maintenance, which will be introduced in the methodology section of this 
paper. The results of this study will be viewed mainly in the light of ELDIA’s own 
scale, but also compared to the one introduced above. 
2.3 Language shift, language maintenance & language revitalization 
Language endangerment is usually preceded by a long process of language shift, 
except in the cases of mass genocide or natural disasters, where a large proportion of 
a population is killed suddenly. Language shift is a symptom of an unequal power 
relationship between two languages or societies: essentially a relationship of 
dominance and submission (Edwards 2013: 73). When language shift occurs, the 
“submissive” or local language loses its functions, social or otherwise, in favor of the 
“dominant” language, also called the language of wider communication (LWC). In 
other words, the speakers of the local language start using the LWC in their daily 
lives at a faster rate than the speaker pool is being replenished by intergenerational 
language transmission (children acquiring the local language from their parents), 
leading initially to language endangerment, and finally to “language death” or 
extinction (Fishman 1989: 391). 
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Language shift is a delicate affair, caused by a multitude of factors. However, 
Fishman (1989: 212) has said that language shift is always a sign of dislocation: the 
breakdown of previously established social functions, relationships, situations and 
domains, that no longer call for the use of the language that was previously used. 
This can happen either among indigenous peoples or (im-)migrants, who find 
themselves surrounded by a powerful LWC, which they start using even internally, 
among their own community. On the contrary, sometimes the (im-)migrants’ 
language takes over and replaces the indigenous local language, but this requires a 
forceful effort, such as in the era of colonialism, often coupled with serious crimes 
against humanity. The optimal situation, where neither of these happens and 
language maintenance is reached, requires diglossia as mentioned above: a situation 
where the LWC and local language have different social functions, and therefore do 
not compete with each other. (Fishman 1989: 202–215). For maintenance to be 
possible, the local language needs to retain control of the domains of necessity 
(home, school and work), as well as positive language attitudes (Edwards 2013: 74). 
Language attitudes refer to the attitudes, prejudices and stereotypes people have 
about language communities, both positive and negative, and both of themselves and 
of others. Language attitudes are based on social connotations, and not on the 
inherent qualities of any language variant itself, although people project these 
attitudes onto the languages themselves. An important factor in determining attitudes 
towards a certain language are its levels of standardization and vitality. Language 
attitudes are primarily manifested as feelings and thoughts, but may sometimes even 
affect our actions in life, for example at school or at work. Attitudes towards 
standard variants usually connect them with high status and competence, while non-
standard variants are perceived as low-status and expressive of a group identity. 
Language attitudes may speed up language shift if an instrumental value of 
usefulness is connected to the dominant language variant, or if one’s own language 
relates to a value of uselessness. (Edwards 2006: 326–329). 
When language shift is caused by attitudes instead of forceful imposition, it is at its 
core a manifestation of power relations. This form of language spread (of the LWC) 
is called language diffusion. In this case, the LWC can rely on its control of cultural 
and economic capital, access to power and resources, as well as the education 
system, to attract speakers of non-dominant languages. It should also be noted, that 
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the language diffusion process has been shown to result in mother tongue 
replacement more often among migrant populations than indigenous populations, 
since indigenous peoples usually still have a relatively intact social structure for the 
use of their languages, since they are less dislocated than migrants. (Fishman 1989: 
242–244). 
To avoid becoming an extinct language, endangered languages should secure 
dominance in the “low” strata of language use, instead of fighting for power in the 
“high” strata with the LWC, which is a fight which they are destined to lose. The 
“low” strata include family, neighborhood, elementary schooling, work and religion, 
while the “high” strata refer to government, art, science, etc. Having a presence on 
the lower levels of working life is crucial for a non-dominant language, since work is 
where most people spend most of their lives, and if the language is present there, 
there is at least some incentive to learn it. Only after security is reached in this 
intimate stratum of language use, can “higher” uses begin to be developed. (Fishman 
1989: 396–401). Forcibly promoting the use of the endangered language in “high” 
domains that are controlled by the LWC has actually lead to a decrease in the use of 
the endangered language in the home, at least in the case of Basque between 1957–
1987 (Fishman 1991: 54–55). For revitalization to succeed, favorable policies are 
required from the government, while community building efforts are needed from the 
populace. For what use are favorable policies and language rights, if no one is 
interested in utilizing them? 
Language revitalization means a concerted and premeditated effort to bring back to 
use a language, which has for whatever reason fallen out of use. Revitalization 
efforts are often aimed at languages that are already dead (extinct), dying (moribund) 
or severely endangered. Some commonly noted examples of successful language 
revitalization are for example the cases of Cornish (last speaker died in 1777, now 
spoken by hundreds as a second language), Hebrew (only used in religious contexts 
for centuries until the 1880s, now vigorously used as the national language of the 
state of Israel), Hawai’ian, and Maori (Edwards 2013: 72,76). Also the recent 
revitalization efforts of Inari Sami in Finland have been considered successful (see 
Pasanen 2015). However, language revitalization efforts would be much easier if 
they were started already before a language reaches this critical stage. Since most 
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languages in the world are expected to go extinct by the end of this century, it could 
even be said that they could all benefit from revitalization efforts. 
In order to revitalize a language or to reverse language shift, in case the language in 
question has not yet gone extinct, one’s first priority should be restoring 
intergenerational language transmission and creating a language environment of 
stable diglossia, where both the local language and the LWC have their clearly 
defined functions or domains. This requires not only an effort from the language 
community in the form of cultural reconstruction and community building, but also 
from institutions in the form of allowing language communities to reclaim their 
linguistic rights and self-control. In the case of an extinct language, some preliminary 
steps are required, such as the reconstruction of the language and the initiation of 
adult second-language teaching (Fishman 1991: 17, 86, 399; Fishman 2001: 466). As 
stated earlier, language attitudes also play a key role in achieving vitality, and they 
often have to be improved. Negative language attitudes are perpetuated through 
stereotypes and legislation that defines the relative status of languages. For 
revitalization to be possible, these need to be changed for more inclusive ones, since 
speakers of low-status linguistic groups are generally less able to mobilize politically 
to improve their situation themselves (Bourhis & Barrette 2006: 247). 
3 Background 
The topic of this thesis falls into the field of sociolinguistics, which means that in 
order to reach an understanding of it, one needs to have a grasp of the social and 
societal background of the language in study. Therefore, a brief introduction to 
Zhuang language issues, Zhuang language education, relevant demographics, and the 
minority and language policies of China will follow. 
3.1 The demographics and language situation of the PRC and Guangxi 
As a country of over 1.33 billion people, the People's Republic of China is an 
ethnically and linguistically diverse state. According to the 2010 census, the Han 
Chinese make up 91.60 percent of the total population, totalling at over 1.22 billion 
people. The remaining 8.40 percent, or approximately 112 million people, is mostly 
composed of the 55 officially recognized ethnic minority groups (National Bureau of 
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Statistics of the People's Republic of China 20105). There are 125 officially 
recognized minority languages in the PRC, although some sources list almost 300 
different languages, depending on the way of counting (Poa & Lapolla 2007: 337; 
Ethnologue 2016c). The official PRC method groups all Sinitic languages or 
“dialects” together as one language, even though many of these dialects are mutually 
unintelligible. This same logic has been applied to minority languages, and therefore 
their official number should be considered lower than linguistic criteria would allow 
for (Poa & LaPolla 2007: 345–346). The languages of the PRC encompass several 
language families, including the Sino-Tibetan, Tai-Kadai, Austro-Asiatic, Hmong-
Mien, and Indo-European families, as well as the Altaic typological group (of 
language families). 
The 56 recognized ethnic groups of China range in size from over 1.2 billion, in the 
case of the Han, to about 3500 in the case of the Tatars. In addition to these 
recognized groups there are also over 640 000 people whose ethnicity has not yet 
been identified, which may mean there are still new groups to be recognized. It 
should be noted, however, that even the existing taxonomy includes some 
inconsistencies, because in some cases, people may have been included in a certain 
ethnic group solely based on their geographic location, while some groups may have 
been divided because of administrative borders, such as in the case of the Bouyei and 
the Zhuang (Poa & LaPolla 2007: 344). See appendix 1 for a complete list of the 
demographic composition of China according to the 2010 census. 
With a population of almost 17 million, the Zhuang are the largest ethnic minority 
group in China. Almost 86 percent of them, or roughly 14.5 million people, live in 
the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (GZAR). Other major concentrations are 
in the neighbouring provinces of Yunnan and Guangdong, which have Zhuang 
populations of roughly 1.2 million and 877 000 respectively. As populous as they 
may seem, the Zhuang make up only about 31.4 percent of the population of the 
GZAR. The largest ethnicity in the autonomous region are the Han, comprising 62.8 
percent of the population. The remaining 5.8 percent are made up of several smaller 
ethnic groups. (National Bureau of Statistics 2010). Within Guangxi, the ethnic 
minority population, including most of the Zhuang, are concentrated in the western 
                                                 
5 Referred to as National Bureau of Statistics 2010 below. 
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part of the autonomous area, while the prefectures with a Han Chinese majority are 
all in the east, close to Guangdong province, as seen in figure 1 and chart 1 below. 
(Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Bureau of Statistics 2011). 
Figure 1: Prefectures with ethnic minorities in majority (dark grey) (Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region Bureau of Statistics 2011). 
 
Figure 1: 1. Baise, 2. Hechi, 3. Liuzhou, 4. Guilin, 5. Hezhou, 6. Chongzuo, 7. Nanning, 8. Laibin, 9. 
Guigang, 10. Wuzhou, 11. Fangchenggang, 12. Qinzhou, 13. Beihai, 14. Yulin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prefecture 
Minority 
Population 
Mi. Percentage 
of total 
Zhuang 
population 
Zh. Percentage 
of total 
Chongzuo 1 757 200 88,11 % N/A N/A 
Baise 2 948 400 85,05 % N/A N/A 
Hechi 2 826 400 83,89 % N/A N/A 
Laibin 1 612 900 76,82 % N/A N/A 
Nanning 3 536 600 53,09 % 3 390 400 50,90 % 
Liuzhou 1 920 100 51,08 % N/A N/A 
Fangchenggang 381 400 44,00 % N/A N/A 
Hezhou 323 200 16,54 % N/A N/A 
Guilin 734 700 15,47 % N/A N/A 
Guigang 608 000 14,76 % N/A N/A 
Qinzhou 325 100 10,56 % N/A N/A 
Wuzhou 64 600 2,24 % N/A N/A 
Beihai 29 900 1,94 % N/A N/A 
Yulin 42 000 0,77 % N/A N/A 
Guangxi total 17 110 500 37,18 % 14 448 500 31,39 % 
Chart 1: Guangxi prefectures by minority population proportion (Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Bureau 
of Statistics 2011). 
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In addition to the Han and the Zhuang, all other 54 officially recognized ethnic 
minority groups are also present in Guangxi (National Bureau of Statistics 2010). 
However, only twelve have a population of over 10 000, which are listed in chart 2 
below. In the late 1980s, Zhuang was still known to act as an inter-ethnic lingua 
franca at least in rural settings (Deng 2012: 143). Nowadays, however, the tool of 
communication between different groups in Guangxi is usually either Putonghua, 
Southwestern Mandarin or a variety of Cantonese (Yuan & Huang 2005: 65). 
Ethnicity Pop. 
Han 汉族 28 916 096 
Zhuang 壮族 14 448 422 
Yao 瑶族 1 493 530 
Miao 苗族 475 492 
Kam 侗族 305 565 
Mulao 仫佬族 172 305 
Maonan 毛南族 65 587 
Hui 回族 32 319 
Vietnamese 京族 23 283 
Bouyei 布依族 20 072 
Sui 水族 13 559 
Manchu 满族 11 159 
Chart 2: Guangxi ethnic groups with populations of over 10 000 (National Bureau of Statistics 2010). 
Although the Zhuang population is large, the Han population is twice its size on the 
Guangxi level and almost a hundred times larger on the national level. In the case of 
some smaller ethnic groups in Guangxi, language shift towards Zhuang has been 
reported to be taking place, while elsewhere reports of Zhuang language shift 
towards Chinese have begun to surface (Li & Luo 2006: 4; Deng 2012: 147). This is 
linked to a general trend in China: due to economic and societal change, contacts 
with other minority groups and the Han have increased, resulting in language shift 
towards more dominant minority languages and ultimately towards Han language 
(Poa & LaPolla 2007: 340). 
In the 2010s, there have been several case studies suggesting ongoing language shift 
or even endangerment of varieties of Zhuang (see Deng 2012 & 2014, Huang 2013, 
Ye 2014). Huang’s (2013) case study of Du’an Yao autonomous county found that 
the domains of Zhuang language use were decreasing, while the number of children 
learning Zhuang as their first language has dropped to around 40 percent, meaning 
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that in this particular case intergenerational language transmission has been disrupted 
(Huang 2013: 8–9). Also Deng’s studies (2012 & 2014) of the Bama Zhuang variety 
found that Zhuang use was restricted to the home and intergenerational transmission 
was in the process of being interrupted. These and other findings brought Deng to the 
conclusion that the Bama variety of Zhuang was in the process of becoming 
endangered, even though it functioned as the lingua franca of the county as recently 
as 1986. Language attitudes in Guangxi favour Han over Zhuang, which is leading to 
Zhuang-speaking parents opting for Han as their domestic language and the language 
of education, so their children would be able to advance in life outside of the village 
(Qin & Sun 2008: 77; Deng 2012: 146; Huang 2013: 9). 
Literacy in Zhuang is reportedly rare among the younger generations (Bodomo 2010: 
181, 188; Kaup 2000: 144–145). Zhuang has been written with two different 
orthographies during its history. The first one to come into use is called sawndip, 
meaning “uncooked/raw letters”, or fāngkuài zhuàngzì 方块壮字 (“square Zhuang 
characters”) in Putonghua. Sawndip was first created during the Tang Dynasty, and 
has been used at least in poetry, lyrics and religious texts, but was never standardized 
and received no support from the local government, which itself used Hànzì (Chinese 
characters) for writing (Zhang et al 1999: 429). In form, the sawndip characters are 
usually a combination of two Hànzì – one representing meaning and the other 
approximating the pronunciation of the word in the local Zhuang variant. Therefore, 
sawndip first requires literacy in Hànzì, as well as the local Zhuang variant in 
question, in order to be comprehensible. Bodomo (2010: 188–189) has reported 
sawndip still being used in 2003 in the worship rituals of Baeuqroxdoh (布洛陀 in 
Chinese), the creator god and primogenitor in the Mo religion of the Zhuang. 
 
Figure 2: The word "sawndip" written in the sawndip orthography (Author: Kanguole; Source: Wikimedia 
Commons). 
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Apart from sawndip, a Romanized orthography called sawcuengh (or zhuàngwén 壮
文 in Putonghua) was created in 1955 by a linguistic work group sent from Beijing, 
led by professor Yuan Jiahua 袁家骅. The orthography is used for writing Standard 
Zhuang, which was also created during that time. Standard Zhuang is based on a 
mixture of Northern Zhuang dialects, and it uses the northern Wuming dialect as its 
phonetic standard. The original sawcuengh orthography uses the Latin alphabet and 
11 additional non-Latin symbols to represent each phoneme. There are several tones 
in Zhuang, and in the orthography, the first tone is unmarked, while the rest are 
marked with the unpronounced letters “z”, “j”, “x”, “q” and “h”, and the pronounced 
letters “p” and “b”, placed in the end of each syllable. An orchestrated effort to 
popularize the script and standard language continued until 1966, when the 
tumultuous Cultural Revolution forced all language promotion work to be ceased and 
the related organizations to be disbanded. The work continued in 1980, and an 
improved version of the script was adopted in 1982, which is still in use today. This 
version of the sawcuengh removed all previously used non-Latin symbols from the 
orthography. (Zhang et al 1999: 429–430). In and after the 1980s, a complete 
bilingual Zhuang-Han education system reaching from preschool to university was 
also established. However, in the 21st century, this system has sunk into a crisis of 
unpopularity, caused by a lack of cooperation between various officials, serious 
employability problems among students, and a constantly worsening environment for 
the use of the Standard Zhuang language and script, among other reasons. (Yuan 
2015: 35, 37–38). 
The sawcuengh orthography was criticized immediately in the 1950s by some 
Zhuang people, who asked whether “this strange squiggly script which looks like a 
chicken’s intestines” could really be called writing, suggesting that the new system 
was too different from the traditional Hànzì or sawndip (Kaup 2000: 140). The script 
was also seemingly created without consideration towards the differences between 
Northern and Southern Zhuang variants. Apart from the script being often deemed 
unintuitive when people first saw it, the selection of the Wuming variant as the 
standard has also been criticized, as it is not easily intelligible with other variants. 
Probably at least partly for this reason, the orthography sees hardly any everyday use 
in Guangxi, apart from two newspapers published in Nanning (Sam Nyied Sam and 
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Gvangjsih Minzcuz Bau). Therefore, it is no surprise that literacy in the script is rare. 
(Bodomo 2010: 181, 188; Kaup 2000: 144–145).  
Low literacy in Zhuang is also linked to a perceived “uselessness” of the language, 
the low funding of Zhuang language education, and the unstandardised, low-quality 
teaching materials (Kaup 2000: 143–146). The disruption caused by the chaos of the 
Cultural Revolution, and the subsequent shift to monolingualism and centralism has 
also been blamed for the failure in creating political, economic and cultural centres 
for the ethnic minority communities of the PRC, which would undoubtedly have 
helped in creating and promoting standardised prestige varieties of the minority 
languages (M. Zhou 2012: 24). 
Even though Guangxi is officially an autonomous region of the Zhuang, Standard 
Zhuang does not play a significant role as an administrative language or an 
interethnic language in the region, as these functions are nowadays occupied by Han 
language. This is especially explicit in the cities, where Zhuang is hardly ever used in 
public contexts, and urban-born children predominantly do not learn Zhuang as their 
first language (Bodomo 2010: 181). In some areas, the dominance of Han language 
reaches even county-level towns, meaning that Zhuang remains relatively safe only 
in the most rural villages where the population is more ethnically homogenous (Deng 
2014: 97–98). 
Since most of the minority groups apart from the Zhuang are relatively small in 
population, it is safe to assume that the minority-dominated prefectures, in the west 
of Guangxi, are mostly populated by Zhuang. One could easily be mistaken to see 
this as a relatively large, continuous Zhuang homestead, beneficial for the use of the 
Zhuang languages. However, as we will learn below, the Zhuang are a “mix and 
match” nationality, made up of speakers of different Tai-Kadai languages dispersed 
around Guangxi and its vicinity, with pockets of unrelated peoples and languages, 
such as the Miao and Yao, mixed among them (Ostapirat 2000: 238). This 
heterogeneity, coupled with the twists and turns of history, has resulted in Han 
language, or more recently Putonghua, taking the role of the local lingua franca. 
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3.2 A short history of the Zhuang in light of ethnic minority policy 
The Tai-speaking peoples nowadays known as the Zhuang, Bouyei (or Buyi), Dai 
etc. are indigenous inhabitants of Southern China and South East Asia, who first 
came into contact with the Chinese during the Qin and Han Dynasties, some 2000 
years ago (Ballard 1981: 165; Kaup 2000: 26–28; Baker 2002: 4). During this period, 
the technologically advanced Chinese started moving into areas south of the 
Yangtze, which were already inhabited by Tai, Austronesian and Tibeto-Burman 
peoples, also known as the Bǎi Yuè, which could be translated as “the hundred 
peoples across the river Yangtze”. The Bǎi Yuè initially resisted colonization, but 
were ultimately absorbed into the growing empire. This resistance and hostility of 
small localities resulted in linguistic divergence, creating the linguistic mosaic zone 
that we nowadays see in Southern China. Linguistic mosaic zones, which consist of 
scattered local languages, typically inhibit the creation of nation states, which has 
also been the case in Southern China. (Edmondson 2007: 18–19). Chinese control 
over the South was finalised during the Song Dynasty, when Song armies defeated 
the Tai leader Nungz Ciqgau, after which the Tai of Southern China would never 
again have a chance at independence, although in the case of Guangxi, ethnic 
violence continued well into the 20th century (Barlow 1987: 250; Kaup 2000: 46). 
The Zhuang of China and the Nung of Vietnam still venerate Nungz Ciqgau as a 
national hero to this day. 
The ethnic minority group known today as the Zhuang was created in 1953 by the 
PRC government by joining together Tai tribes that felt little connection or unity to 
each other. These tribes had even been engaged in warfare against each other in the 
past. (Kaup 2000: 4–5). These tribes are divided into two groups: one speaking 
Northern Tai languages and one speaking Central Tai languages. These language 
groups are what the Chinese call the “Northern Zhuang dialect” and “the Southern 
Zhuang dialect”. However, the mesh of languages and identities is more complex 
than that, as over a dozen autonyms have been recorded among the Zhuang, which 
should be considered when recognizing different communities (Zhang et al 1999: 3–
4, 318). Some of the “Northern Zhuang dialect” speakers use autonyms akin to the 
name “Zhuang”, while some of them use the same autonym as their northern 
neighbours and linguistic relatives, the Bouyei of Guizhou province. Meanwhile, 
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“Southern Zhuang” speakers use the same autonyms as their southern neighbours and 
linguistic relatives, the Tho and Nung of Vietnam. (Luo 2008b: 319).  
The division of autonyms as well as linguistic features within the northern and 
southern groups have been explained as the two groups having divergent roots 
among the ancient Bǎi Yuè people. Chinese Zhuang researchers agree that the 
Northern Zhuang group, as well as the Bouyei, are descended from the ancient Xī’ōu 
西瓯 people, who used to live in the region some 2000 years ago. Meanwhile, the 
Southern Zhuang group, including the Tho and Nung of Vietnam, originates from the 
Luòyuè 骆越 people, who inhabited southern Guangxi and northern Vietnam at that 
same period. These two peoples started to mingle and finally amalgamated together 
only after Emperor Qin Shi Huang invaded the Bǎi Yuè in 221 BCE, forcing them 
under a unified administration. (Zhang et al 1999: 6–8). 
The mosaic-like ethnic composition of the Guangxi area, and Southwestern China in 
general, has undoubtedly been further complicated over time by the rugged 
landscape of the area. The poor infrastructure and communication networks of the 
past made interaction over long distances impractical, which meant that the many 
scattered peoples of any given area usually only had made contact with their 
immediate neighbours – often in this case, peoples of different ethnicities that spoke 
non-Tai languages. Even if there were people beyond the neighbouring villages who 
could be considered part of the same group, they would anyhow be excluded, as 
there was no frequent communication with them. This resulted in many interspersed 
groups that all had developed a separate identity of their own. And to complicate the 
situation even further, Guangxi has seen many forced population transfers at 
different stages of history, that have further mixed the ethnic map of the area (Zhang 
et al 1999: 13). The Zhuang never had the chance to develop a unified script, and 
neither have they had any recent experiences of independent statehood that would 
have created a sense of nationalism among the different groups (Kaup 2000: 56–58). 
After the Communist revolution, this posed a problem for the CCP that wanted to 
unite the Zhuang to fight for the common cause of socialism. 
After seizing political power, in order to implement its economic and social plans, 
the CCP had to gain control of the entire territory of the PRC. To achieve this, it first 
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had to integrate vast minority areas into the PRC state, which was done by appealing 
to the ethnic minorities with promises of autonomy. During the first four years of its 
administration, the CCP received calls for recognition from over four hundred 
different groups that sought official minority status, seeking the benefits that came 
therein, such as autonomy. The CCP could not grant autonomous government to all 
the different groups in western Guangxi, so they decided to convince several local 
groups of belonging to a larger group called the “Zhuang”. (Kaup 2000: 73–74). 
Few Zhuang actively promoted Zhuang autonomy and many actually resisted it, 
claiming that their nationality was not Zhuang, but Zhuang-speaking Han instead, 
perhaps out of fear of the ethnic clashes that had continued until the founding of the 
PRC, or of previous experiences of exploitation by the ruling class (Kaup 2000: 46–
47, 87). In the first national census of 1953 many Zhuang still registered themselves 
either as Han or as a member of their local tribe or branch, while only 6.61 million 
registered themselves as Zhuang. (Kaup 2000: 87, 91). Therefore, the CCP 
dispatched ethnic identification teams to clear out the situation. Political factors 
weighed in heavily and nationality was sometimes defined more by geographical 
location than the characteristics of any individual groups. (Kaup 2000: 88). Finally, 
in 1958, the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous region was founded as the autonomous 
area of the newly-created Zhuang nationality, radically altering the existing local 
conceptions of ethnic identity (Kaup 2000: 73–74). 
3.3 One Zhuang language or several Zhuang languages? 
The Zhuang languages are a group of Tai languages spoken mostly by the Zhuang 
nationality in the GZAR and the adjacent provinces of Guangdong and Yunnan, as 
well as in Vietnam near the Sino-Vietnamese border ( Zhang et al 1999: 1). The 
Zhuang languages belong to the Tai language group, which is usually classified as a 
subgroup of the Tai-Kadai (Kra-Dai) language family. Tai-Kadai is a language 
family of almost 100 million speakers, and it is most diverse in Southern China. 
Meanwhile, its largest population centre and spread zone lies in South-East Asia, 
where for example Thai and Lao are spoken, which are the only Tai-Kadai languages 
that serve as national languages. (Diller 2008: 31; Enfield 2005: 184). 
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There is still an ongoing debate about the definition of Tai-Kadai and it could be 
discussed in length, along with the related terminology, which is still evolving. 
Traditionally the Tai languages have been linked with Sino-Tibetan, forming a 
language family called Sino-Tai, a theory still supported by Chinese scholars. 
Elsewhere the theory has been abandoned since the 1940s, since the similarities 
between Sinitic and Tai are only due to borrowings (Smyth 2006: 481). Nowadays, 
the Tai languages are usually grouped together with the Kadai (Kra) languages, 
forming the Tai-Kadai (Kra-Dai) family, which is considered non-controversial 
outside of China. A more controversial connection between Tai and Austronesian has 
also been suggested (Benedict 1997, Sagart 2004).  Overall, the nature of the 
connections of Tai-Kadai still remains somewhat unsettled (Pittayaporn 2009: 5; Luo 
2008a: 9–24). 
There are different opinions about the classification of Zhuang as well. Chinese 
linguists often consider it one language divided into two dialects (fāngyán 方言), 
northern and southern, which are further split into local variants (tǔyǔ 土语). For 
example, Zhang et al (1999: 12–13) divide the two dialects into 13 local variants. 
However, outside of China, the northern and southern dialect groups are usually 
considered to be different languages (Smyth 2006: 481). Some even suggest that also 
the local variants could be considered separate languages (Pittayaporn 2009: 298; 
Ethnologue 2016a). Ethnologue (2016a) lists 16 different languages grouped under 
the Zhuang macrolanguage, two of which are classified as threatened, and one as 
moribund. According to Ethnologue (2016a) the largest of these languages is 
Yongbei Zhuang, with almost two million speakers, while the smallest is Lianshan 
Zhuang, with 48,000 speakers. 
The two so-called Zhuang dialects actually belong to different branches of the Tai 
language family: Northern Zhuang is a part of the Northern Tai branch and Southern 
Zhuang belongs to the Central Tai branch. Northern Zhuang is more similar to its 
northern neighbour Bouyei than to Southern Zhuang, while Southern Zhuang is more 
similar to its southern neighbour Nung than to Northern Zhuang. (Li 1976; 
Edmondson & Solnit 1997: 2; Luo 2008b: 318–319). 
It is quite safe to say that at least Northern and Southern Zhuang are separate 
languages. Chinese scholars will hardly recognize this fact, however, as it seems 
natural to them that dialects of one language may be unintelligible to each other. This 
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is as much a political question as it is a terminological one. The Chinese often use the 
term fāngyán indiscriminately of both languages and dialects, but perhaps even more 
importantly, if one were to recognize, for example, that all the unintelligible Zhuang 
“dialects” were separate languages, it would logically lead one to the realization that 
all the unintelligible Chinese “dialects” must also be separate languages. And from 
the point of view of Chinese nationalism, this is indeed a dangerous idea. 
 
Figure 3: Zhuang dialects by county based on Zhang et al (1999: 12–13). 
Figure 3 above illustrates the areas of the different Zhuang “dialects” spoken in 
Guangxi, Guangdong and Yunnan provinces, as classified by Zhang et al (1999: 12–
13). Provincial borders are represented by black lines, prefecture-level city borders 
by grey lines, and county borders by white lines. Bouyei, which is spoken in Guizhou 
province to the north, as well as Tho and Nung, which are spoken in Vietnam to the 
south, are not presented on the map, as they are not officially classified as Zhuang, 
although they are intelligible to speakers of Northern and Southern Zhuang 
respectively. In this map, Northern Zhuang variants are represented by different 
shades of red, while Southern Zhuang variants are shades of blue. Counties where 
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more than one variant is spoken, are marked with special colours: brown in the case 
of both Liujiang and Hongshuihe being spoken, purple in the case of both an adjacent 
northern and a southern variant being spoken (Yongbei and Yongnan; Guibian and 
Yanguang), and lime in the case of two adjacent southern variants being spoken 
(Wenma and Yanguang). Counties where the Zhuang do not form a majority of the 
population are in grey, except for the counties in Guangdong province that are 
coloured to highlight the presence of the Lianshan Zhuang variant. 
Although Zhang et al (1999: 30–50) calls them dialects, many of these variants are 
not mutually intelligible. Mutual intelligibility is only mentioned in the case of the 
Southern variants of Zuojiang, Dejing and Yanguang, even in which case 
conversation is only possible with difficulty. Some variants are described as having 
notable internal variation that impedes communication, which, as for example in the 
case of the Yongnan variant, can reach such levels, that even Yongnan speakers from 
the same county cannot necessarily converse with each other. In the case of many of 
the northern variants, intra-variant communication is possible, however. Lexical 
similarity between northern and southern variants is only around 60–68 percent, 
while among the variants spoken in Yunnan province it is only between 50–65 
percent. This can be compared for example to German and English, between which 
lexical similarity is about 60 percent. (Zhang et al 1999: 309; Ethnologue 2016b). 
The dialect divisions proposed by Zhang et al (1999) are solely based on phonology, 
and it is clear that his model does not reflect actual speech communities. Therefore, 
the division of Zhuang into more than two languages and 13 dialects should be 
considered. 
Apart from the various Zhuang languages, there are also some members of the ethnic 
group who speak Kra languages, which form the second, and linguistically quite 
different, branch of the Tai-Kadai (Kra-Dai) language family (Ostapirat 2000: 238). 
The Kra languages spoken by a part of the Zhuang ethnicity include Lachi, Paha, 
Buyang and Pubiao, whose speakers can be found for example in the Wenshan 
Zhuang and Miao autonomous prefecture in eastern Yunnan province (Huang 2016: 
22). Although language is supposed to be a major factor in nationality identification 
in China, these Kra speakers are still classified as belonging to the Zhuang ethnic 
group. This is not unheard of, as somewhat crude methods were utilized in the ethnic 
identification process of the PRC, meaning that different ethnic or linguistic groups 
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were sometimes grouped together because of their geographic location, or because 
the linguistic affiliation of the language spoken by the group was unclear (Kaup 
2000: 88; Huang 2016: 23). 
The exact number of speakers of the Zhuang languages is unknown, since the PRC 
census does not record the mother tongues of its citizens. Some estimates do exist 
however, but the numbers vary widely. Some estimates that include also the related 
but differently named languages in the surrounding countries and regions, give a 
number as high as 20 million, while those that only include the Zhuang ethnic group 
often end up at 16 million (Bodomo 2010: 180). These estimates seem slightly 
unconvincing, since both researchers and many Zhuang people themselves consider 
the Zhuang languages to be decreasing in popularity, and most cities in Guangxi 
function in Putonghua. The number of Zhuang speakers was estimated at roughly 
12.8 million already in the end of the 1990s, but this estimate was based on a survey 
from 1982, and is therefore highly outdated (Zhang et al 1999: 29–30). Although the 
Zhuang population has grown since the 1980s, it would be highly unlikely that the 
speaker population would reach such a high level as in the 1980s, since language 
policy emphasis has shifted generally away from Zhuang after that time (see below 
for details). A more believable estimate is given by Qingsheng Zhou (2016: 101) 
based on Grant D. McConnell’s 1995 study, reaching a total of 11,317,900 speakers. 
The Zhuang population in 1995 was roughly 16 million (Bradley 2006: 322). I would 
expect that the current speaker proportion would not be much higher. This would 
mean that roughly one third of the 16.9 million Zhuang living in the PRC do not 
speak Zhuang. 
This paper will mostly be referring to the Zhuang languages as simply “Zhuang”, 
referring to the macrolanguage that includes the numerous individual Tai-Kadai 
languages and dialects, as this is how it is officially called by the PRC government, 
and it can be expected that this official stance has also influenced the views of the 
speakers of the Zhuang languages themselves. Working on the macro-level was 
necessary for the sake of successfully finishing this study, as many young Zhuang 
have migrated to different parts of China, meaning it would have been quite difficult 
to find sufficient numbers of young adult speakers of a certain Zhuang language, 
given the limited budget and timetable of the study. 
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3.4 The minority and language policies of the PRC 
Minority policy lays the basis of the language environment of a country. In the case 
of the PRC, minority policy was of central importance already in the beginning, since 
ethnic minority areas span large swathes of land in the north, west and south of the 
country, taking up 60 percent of the total area of the PRC (Poa & LaPolla 2007: 
337). In practice, however, PRC minority policy has swayed back and forth between 
supportive and rejective stances according to the political whims of the CCP. Most of 
the roughly 110 million strong ethnic minority population is indigenous, a status 
which the PRC does not recognize (M. Zhou 2012: 18; Beckett & Postiglione 2012: 
4). 
Apart from forming a major part of the landmass, minority areas also contain large 
proportions of the natural resources of the PRC. Therefore, gaining the support of 
ethnic minorities and having a well-formed minority policy early on was crucial to 
the CCP. The party strived to accomplish this by offering favourable conditions and 
outright privileges to ethnic minorities, quickly recognizing 55 official minority 
groups after the revolution. The CCP copied the criteria for ethnic recognition from 
Joseph Stalin’s nationality theory, which were “a common language”, “a common 
region”, “a common economic life” and “common psychological characteristics” 
(Feng & Cheung 2008: 249–250). However, in many cases, non-related groups or 
peoples were labelled under one title, and in some cases, such as the Hui, the groups 
were not created based on ethnicity but other factors, such as religion. 
Initially, the PRC’s minority policy was inspired by the Soviet model, which was 
altered to suit Chinese needs. Instead of adopting a state model of a union of 
republics, China opted for a system of a central seat of power, that ruled over local 
governments. Ethnic minorities, or “nationalities”, as they were called back then, 
were granted regional autonomy and guaranteed linguistic freedoms. This system 
endorsed multilingualism in a way that placed Putonghua as the centre of gravity, 
around which minority languages would revolve as satellites. (M. Zhou 2012: 22). At 
this point, Putonghua was still treated as a supplementary language, and speaking it 
was not an essential prerequisite for being a PRC citizen (Beckett & Postiglione 
2012: 5). 
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PRC minority policy centred on the idea of national unity, meaning that although 
minorities would have the right to self-governance, they would not have the right to 
separate from the state. Another basic tenet was that all nationalities were equal 
under Socialism. However, the ideology also stated that during the transition to 
Communism, nationalities would naturally cease to exist and converge into a new, 
united Chinese nation. (Feng & Cheung 2008: 254–255; M. Zhou 2012: 23).  
To speed up this convergence, standard languages were created for different 
nationalities, including 16 standards for minority languages (M. Zhou 2012: 23). One 
of these is also Putonghua – an artificial standard language based on the Beijing 
dialect of Mandarin Chinese, and as such is not the true first language of any part of 
the population of the PRC (Huang 2016: 24). Putonghua was first meant to be the 
common language of the Han nationality only. It was created to unify the numerous 
Sinitic languages and dialects, and meant to consolidate a united Han identity. (M. 
Zhou 2012: 22–23). 
This remained true in the first years of the PRC, during which the CCP garnered 
support from ethnic minorities by granting them autonomy and economic privileges, 
preferential treatment in education, poverty alleviation programs, etc. These policies 
were very successful in uniting minority groups under the CCP and improving their 
conditions in the early years of the People’s Republic, and they may even be one of 
the reasons why the PRC avoided the fate of the Soviet Union. (Feng & Cheung 
2008: 257).  
Already in the late 1950s, however, when the Great Leap Forward began, Putonghua 
was brought to the forefront of minority policy to function as an inter-ethnic 
language, that would speed up the convergence of nationalities, and the evolution to 
Communism. The idea of a single Chinese nation was stressed even further during 
the Cultural Revolution, when Putonghua was spread to public domains all over the 
PRC, and minorities were forced to adopt the language and assimilate into the Han 
majority. (M. Zhou 2012: 23–24; Ma 2007: 14–15). 
After the Cultural Revolution, the minority policies of the 1980s saw a sway back 
towards acceptance, as for example minority language education was resumed (Ma 
2007: 15). However, the Cultural Revolution had already irreversibly changed the 
linguistic landscape of the PRC, and this was quickly recognized in an amendment to 
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the constitution in 1982, which made Putonghua the official common language of all 
nationalities in the PRC (M. Zhou 2012: 24).  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the PRC shifted to a market economy 
and replaced the Soviet style multinational state with a more monolingual model 
based on the slogan of “one nation with diversity” (zhōnghuámínzú duōyuán yītǐ 中华
民族多元一体), which is still used today. This model endorses Putonghua as a “super 
language” that occupies political, legal, financial and other public functions, while 
marginalizing minority languages into being merely a symbol of diversity. (M. Zhou 
2012: 26). During this time, minority language use began to fall out of priority and 
the ongoing campaign of “Mandarinisation” began (Poa & LaPolla 2007: 347). 
The position of Putonghua was further propped up in the language law of 2000 
(guójiā tōngyòng yǔyán wénzì fǎ 国家通用语言文字法), which stipulated for the first 
time, that Putonghua is the national language (guójiā tōngyòng yǔyán 国家通用语言) 
of the PRC. This law also stipulates that public servants working in government, 
media, education and other services have an obligation to study and use Putonghua. 
The freedom of ethnic minorities to use and develop their own languages, as granted 
in the constitution, is retained. However, the law places the languages of the PRC in 
an unequal position, making the PRC a monolingual Putonghua state, that retains 
multilingualism only on the local level. (Zhou 2016: 93, 99). In the 21st century, the 
language environment of the PRC has turned increasingly assimilationist, with for 
example Uyghur and Tibetan language instruction being replaced by Mandarin 
instruction in many schools, as well as the use of Cantonese being restricted in media 
(Beckett & Postiglione 2012: 3–4). 
The ethnic minorities of the PRC and their languages are currently facing increasing 
pressures from society. This is often blamed on a disconnection between minority 
legislation and practice, which has been caused by a lack of rule of law, and the 
transition from a planned economy to a market economy. Minority autonomy is not 
being effectively implemented, which can be seen for example from the fact that the 
autonomous areas’ CCP secretaries, who hold the most power in local government, 
are usually Han Chinese. Also many of the preferential economic policies have fallen 
out of use, because of being economically unviable in the new Capitalist system. 
(Feng & Cheung 2008: 257). In the current situation, many minorities are faced with 
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a choice between (personal) economic development and cultural preservation, 
meaning that many are shifting to use Putonghua out of economic necessity (Poa & 
LaPolla 2007: 347). 
The ethnic minorities of the PRC are granted several rights in the country’s 
constitution, but these rights are not universally realized, as there are large regional 
differences caused by ambiguity in the legislation and the lax enforcement of these 
laws (Shi 2016: 16). The basis of China's minority policy after liberation was the 
equality of all nationalities, and minority languages were granted equal legitimate 
status to the Han language (Ma 2007: 11). It is these rights that are nowadays not 
being effectively protected. In a somewhat similar manner, minorities were promised 
full autonomy and the right to separate from the PRC at their own will, but this 
promise was taken back soon after the revolution (Gladney 2004: 11). The linguistic 
rights currently granted to ethnic minorities in PRC law include the following: 
1. The right to use and develop the language and script of one’s ethnic group. 
2. When carrying out their duties, institutions of ethnic autonomy must use the 
language and script of the local ethnic group as ruled by law. 
3. Ethnic minority education shall be carried out either in Putonghua and Standard 
Hànzì, or bilingually. 
4. The studying of the language and script of each ethnicity shall be encouraged. 
5. The development of the use of ethnic minority languages shall be aided, and a 
suitable environment for such activities shall be provided. 
6. A workforce that can use the languages and scripts of ethnic minorities shall be 
trained in great numbers. 
7. In affairs of justice, the language and script of the ethnicity in question shall be 
used. (Huang 2016: 57–58). [Author’s translation.] 
The laws that stipulate on minority languages and bilingual education include the 
fourth article of the constitution of the PRC, the minority regional self-governance 
law (mínzú qūyù zìzhì fǎ 民族区域自治法), the national common language and script 
law (guójiā tōngyòng yǔyán wénzì fǎ 国家通用语言文字法), the education law (jiàoyù 
fǎ 教育法) and the law on compulsory education (yìwù jiàoyù fǎ 义务教育法) (Wan & 
Liu 2012: 82). 
It is worth noting, that PRC legislation on minority languages is ambiguous in its 
expression of the priority of languages. For example, the constitution calls for the use 
of minority languages in education, but also says the promotion of Putonghua should 
be prioritized at the same time (Ma 2007: 15; Poa & LaPolla 2007: 347). This is also 
visible in the national curriculum: 
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“Drive bilingual education forward with great force. Comprehensively offer Putonghua 
language courses; comprehensively promote the national common language and script. 
Respect and ensure the right of minorities to receive education in their own language 
and script. Comprehensively strengthen preschool bilingual education. The country 
offers its support to the education of teachers, educational research, and the 
development and publishing of educational materials for bilingual education” (Wan & 
Liu 2012: 81). [Author’s translation.] 
This same trend is also present in the law on regional ethnic autonomy, which states 
in a similar tone, that minority languages should be used in education when possible, 
but stresses that Putonghua teaching shall be provided in senior grades: 
“…schools where most of the students come from minority ethnic groups should, 
whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use these languages as the 
media of instruction; classes for the teaching of Chinese (the Han language) shall be 
opened for senior grades of primary schools or for secondary schools to popularize 
Mandarin.” (Xia 2008: 39). 
These policies do leave some room for the development of minority languages, 
although they do make it very clear that proficiency in Putonghua is the ultimate 
goal. Even though officially minority languages are equal to Putonghua, in actual 
society they take a submissive role, and are replaced by Putonghua or Han language 
outside of private language use situations. Where bilingualism exists, it is often of an 
unequal nature, meaning that minorities learn Putonghua or Han language, but the 
Han living in the area do not learn the minority language, which is the case at least 
with Tibetan and Mongol (Poa & LaPolla 2007: 340; Ma 2007: 11). 
On one hand, the legislation encourages minority language education, but on the 
other, it demands the spread of Putonghua. The execution of this legislation leaves no 
ambiguity, however, as a clear instrumentalist approach is adopted: offering minority 
language instruction on junior grades (if even then) and Putonghua instruction on 
senior grades. In other words, the minority language is used as a tool for learning 
Putonghua. This instrumentalist approach becomes even more obvious when one 
considers the fact that almost all higher education is in Putonghua (Poa & LaPolla 
2007: 348). The sudden shift to this policy in the 2000s has caused some problems, 
as ethnic minorities are experiencing difficulties in education around the country. 
Under-performance in entrance examinations, illiteracy, employment difficulties, 
high drop-out rates and general backwardness in education quality have been 
reported among many ethnic minority groups and their institutions of higher 
education (Ma 2012: 40; Y. Zhou 2012: 75; Wang & Postiglione 2012: 101; Tsung et 
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al 2012: 105; Wu et al 2012: 137–138). The negative developments in minority 
learning results in Putonghua schooling come as no surprise, as many international 
studies have stressed the importance of the students’ first language in learning and in 
the efficient acquisition of second and further languages (Kosonen 2005: 87–89, 
Nikièma 2011: 606–611, Schwartz et al 2012: 565–567). 
In the year 2007, only 20 out of the 55 ethnic minorities had a system of bilingual 
education in use, as it has not been made compulsory by law (Xia 2008: 40; Zhou 
2016: 99). There is, however, an existing policy on bilingual education with three 
different models for organizing it, but, here as well, the core idea seems to be the use 
of the minority language as a stepping stone or “crutch” on the way to learning 
Putonghua, with the minority language being phased out on higher levels of 
education. This can be seen for example in the present system of bilingual education 
in use in Tibet, where most children attend pre-school and primary school in Tibetan, 
but from junior high school onward, education is in Putonghua. Tibetan instruction is 
offered in only one vocational high school. In the case of higher education, there 
were three universities with instruction in Putonghua, while Tibetan instruction was 
available only in three majors. (Ma 2007: 18). 
The autonomous regions and areas of the PRC have the right to choose their 
language of education, therefore there are large differences between different parts of 
the country in the practice of bilingual education. For example, in the north-eastern 
Korean minority areas, bilingual education is widely in use, whereas in the 
southwestern minority areas bilingual education is struggling. In some cases, 
students have problems understanding what is being taught, as textbooks are only 
available in Putonghua, and in other cases, instruction in the mother tongue is 
available only to a fraction of the population. (Xia 2008: 44). However, instruction in 
Putonghua is often the wish of the parents, as for example according to a poll from 
2006, 93 percent of parents in Guangxi wished for teaching to be conducted in 
Putonghua (Huang 2013: 3). 
Xia (2008: 44–45) lists three reasons for the state not requiring minority schools to 
offer instruction in minority languages. Firstly, offering bilingual education or 
teaching in minority languages would require a financial investment too large for the 
average minority area, which are often poor and remote. Second, economic demands 
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drive people towards an emphasis on Mandarin, as the minority languages are almost 
never used as working languages anywhere. Third, minority languages are not widely 
recognized as an important factor in preserving ethnic culture and identity. (Xia 
2008: 44–45). 
The current system of minority language education and policy seems to stem from a 
time when the ethnic minorities of China were still largely monolingual in their own 
languages and cut off from the rest of the country. The system aims at making 
minorities as proficient as possible in Putonghua, while neglecting the minority 
languages, which do not have any official function in government or business. Ethnic 
minorities are still significantly poorer than the Han (Cao 2010: 979), which may 
mean that many of them view language learning from a purely utilitarian point of 
view. This makes for a situation where minorities are not interested in teaching their 
own languages to their children, since knowledge in them is not easily translatable 
into a higher income in current society. Due to this, and the enormous volume of the 
Han population among other things, it could be that even large minority languages 
could be facing a maintenance crisis in the near future. Since the campaign to spread 
Putonghua began in the 1990s, people born in the 1980s or later have received most 
of their education in Putonghua. Therefore, it could be expected that language shift 
from minority languages to Putonghua is currently happening among this generation. 
Some of them might still be bilingual, but unless something is done about the current 
situation, the following generations can be expected to be increasingly monolingual 
Putonghua speakers. 
Language shift is already a common phenomenon in China, and apart from minority 
and education policies, it is caused by at least three factors: economic change, 
migration, and language attitudes (Poa & Lapolla 2007: 339–341). The economic 
transformation of China has meant that many minority groups have moved from an 
agricultural economy to a cash economy, increasing contact with other groups in the 
process. The economic change has also led to widespread migration, meaning that 
ethnic minorities are leaving their autonomous areas for big cities in the more 
economically developed parts of China, which are mostly Han Chinese. These 
minority migrants are surrounded by Han language and culture, and are in danger of 
either forgetting their mother tongues or not passing them down to their children. 
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This migration also goes the other way, with Han migrants moving to minority areas, 
“diluting” the minority populations of the autonomous areas. This has caused 
increased ethnic tension in some areas, especially Xinjiang. Another important factor 
is that Chinese minority policy is designed to regulate minorities in their home areas, 
and does not address the migration issue in any way. (Feng & Cheung 2008: 259–
261). 
Among other things, the PRC minority policy has been criticized of laying emphasis 
on the values of “globalization” and “modernization”, and not advocating the 
protection of minority language rights strongly enough. Minority language rights are 
mentioned in legislation, but there is no law that would clearly and bindingly protect 
them. Minority languages are also not bindingly defined as the languages of 
administration, justice or media of autonomous areas, leading to a situation where 
minorities are often unable to access public services or even news reports in their 
own languages. (Fan 2016: 115–116). 
The realization and protection of the language rights granted to ethnic minorities in 
PRC legislation is the first task to be completed in order to protect the many 
endangered languages of China, as well as creating a functional role for all minority 
languages in the Chinese society, beyond being merely being a symbol of diversity. 
To achieve this, an urgent and extensive effort is required also in the standardization 
and digitalization of the minority languages of the PRC. (Huang 2016: 66–69; State 
Ethnic Affairs Commission of the PRC 2010). 
Although not a question of policy, Han chauvinism, or the belief that Han culture and 
language are the pinnacle of sophistication, is also a problem for the maintenance of 
minority languages. Although the PRC constitution vows to fight Han chauvinism, 
shifting to Putonghua is still often seen as a method of raising one’s cultural level, 
which spells problems for both Sinitic and non-Sinitic minority languages. For non-
Han minorities’ language attitudes, it is also problematic that all levels of 
administration and education are totally dominated by Putonghua. (Poa & LaPolla 
2007: 341).  
The current PRC language policy model endorses an unbalanced language ideology, 
where minorities are expected to use Putonghua as their primary language and their 
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native languages as only supplementary languages, in an effort to construct an all-
inclusive, Putonghua-speaking Chinese national identity (Zhōnghuá mínzú 中华民族). 
The expansion of the power of Putonghua in the language law of 2000 has caused 
increased drop-out rates, failing education and decreasing social mobility among the 
ethnic minorities, and may cause serious social problems in the future. (M. Zhou 
2012: 27–28). The recurrent shifting of minority policy during the history of the PRC 
has undoubtedly damaged the vitality and development of minority languages in the 
country, as minority education, for example, has not had the chance to develop 
steadily due to constant changes in the political objectives of the time. This 
instability has not only affected minority education, but also the minority languages 
as a whole, weakening their relative position in comparison to Putonghua, which has 
been developed continuously. 
4 Methodology 
The goal of this study is to look for preliminary signs of language shift among young 
Zhuang, using a modified version of the ELDIA European Language Vitality 
Barometer questionnaire. The situation of the Zhuang languages (as noted in chapter 
3) suggests that it may be possible that language shift is already occurring among the 
Zhuang. If language shift is indeed happening, it could be a sign that other, less-
privileged minority languages in the area could be facing even greater threat. This 
study aims to provide a preliminary assessment about whether language shift is 
occurring among young Zhuang, and make some conclusions about the general 
language maintenance situation of the Zhuang languages. 
4.1 The ELDIA European Language Vitality Barometer and the methods 
of this study 
The questionnaire used in this study is based on the European Language Vitality 
Barometer (EuLaViBar) questionnaire compiled by the ELDIA research project. The 
EuLaViBar questionnaire toolkit was produced by and is the intellectual property of 
the international ELDIA research team, a collection of sociolinguistics scholars 
cooperating across Europe, including countries and areas such as Germany, Finland, 
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Austria, Sweden, Estonia, Åland and Slovenia, funded by the European Commission 
between 2010–2013. 
The ELDIA project’s goal was to create a systematic and generalizable tool for 
assessing multilingualism in Europe, while laying special emphasis on situations 
where linguistic diversity, use of different linguae francae and/or questions of 
language vitality, preservation or endangerment exist. For these reasons, I was 
intrigued to see if the method could be used for surveys outside of the European 
context. 
The ELDIA project produced 12 language-specific case reports of minority 
languages spoken in Finland, Sweden, Norway, Russia, Estonia, Germany, Austria 
and Slovenia, all of them belonging to the Finno-Ugric language family. ELDIA 
stresses that data or figures acquired with the EuLaViBar toolkit should not be used 
to predict the future faith of minority languages, since any unforeseen changes in 
several factors may affect the outcome as well. EuLaViBar data should always be 
assessed with an understanding of the relevant linguistic, social, political and cultural 
situation. 
It should be noted that the questionnaire used in this study is based on the 
EuLaViBar toolkit, but it is not entirely similar. A few questions were left out for the 
sake of brevity, while others were slightly modified in the process of translation. The 
questionnaire was translated into Putonghua by the author, and some questions about 
participants’ personal views had to be altered slightly to correspond to the East Asian 
culture of avoiding expressing one’s personal thoughts or feelings. In other words, 
questions were modified to prompt a more personal response. The number of 
questions related to the participants’ children was decreased, as most of target 
demographic was not expected to have children yet. 
By using the modified EuLaViBar questionnaire, this study aims to provide some 
qualitative data about the use and domains of, as well as attitudes towards the 
Zhuang languages among young people. Some limited quantitative data was also 
gathered on specific issues, such as knowledge of standard Zhuang orthography and 
experiences of Zhuang language education. 
The participants were selected randomly, with (at least partial) Zhuang ethnicity and 
being born in the 1980s or later as the only prerequisites for participation. This age 
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group was selected as they have grown up and gone through the educational system 
during a time when PRC minority policy has experienced significant changes 
towards emphasising Putonghua over minority languages, which to an ever-
increasing degree is still the case today. Therefore, this age group may possibly show 
signs of ongoing language shift. 
Most of the data was gathered in the spring of 2015 by the means of an online 
questionnaire distributed through the University of Helsinki “E-lomake” website. 
The participants of the online questionnaire were found by asking local contacts to 
forward a message advertising the study on Chinese social media. The questionnaire 
received 29 replies in a couple of days, mainly from different cities in Southern 
China. In order to guarantee a higher demographic variety, I also made two field trips 
to rural villages in Guangxi in the spring of 2015, where I managed to gather data 
from nine randomly selected informants through assisted questionnaire completion.  
The first field trip was to the southern part of Guangxi, or more precisely, Kanwei 
township of Daxin county of Chongzuo city. The area is part of the Zhuang heartland 
next to the Vietnamese border, with a sweeping majority of the population being 
ethnically Zhuang. Unfortunately, this area proved to be largely empty of young 
people of the target age, as most of them had migrated to the big cities. As I did not 
have time to head for Chongzuo city proper without any local connections, I was 
only able to find a few suitable individuals in the villages around Kanwei township.  
Wisened from my earlier experiences, on the second field trip I headed for a livelier 
area, albeit still in the countryside. Ping’an village is a popular tourist destination 
sitting amidst the famous Longji rice terrace scenic area of Longsheng various 
nationalities’ autonomous county, in the northern mountains of Guilin city. The 
village is mostly habited by Zhuang people, and due to the successful tourism 
business, many young locals have stayed there to run guesthouses and restaurants, 
providing a better supply of participants compared to the first field trip. 
On both field trips, I offered a small monetary compensation for the participants’ 
time, which almost all of them adamantly refused to accept. In some cases, the 
refusal was made from modesty and the money was accepted in the end, while in 
other cases participants demanded to treat me as their guest and there was simply no 
way of giving them the compensation. 
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After these field trips, it was quite clear that county-level or perhaps even prefecture-
level cities would be the most desirable destinations for conducting this kind of field 
work, due to the migration current heading out from the countryside, even if most 
cities in Guangxi are linguistically dominated by Han language. In the case of cities, 
however, it would be recommendable to have local contacts that could help with 
finding informants, as city dwellers are generally busier and warier towards strangers 
than people in the countryside. Unfortunately, I was unable to procure this kind of 
help despite repeated attempts to contact local Zhuang researchers and professors. 
4.2 Materials 
The questionnaire used in this study is based on the ELDIA EuLaViBar 
questionnaire, with slight changes made during translation, as well as a few 
omissions made for brevity’s sake. This study is not connected to the ELDIA project 
in any way, and the data gathered here is not comparable to that provided by a full-
scale EuLaViBar survey, which usually involves hundreds of participants. 
The modified questionnaire spans 13.5 pages, including questions about the 
participant’s personal information, linguistic background, language skills, 
background information about language use, language attitudes, public and private 
language use and media use. The questionnaire is divided into sections ranging from 
A to G, and include 40 questions in total, some of which are divided into several sub-
questions. 
 Section A:  personal information – sex, age, ethnicity, place of birth, place of 
residence, academic background and employment status. 
 Section B: linguistic background – mother tongue, where they have studied 
Zhuang, what languages each of their grandparents used with them, what 
languages their parents used with each other, what languages each of their 
parents used with them in their childhood and now, what languages they used 
with their siblings in their childhood and now, whether someone tried to stop 
their parents from using Zhuang with them, whether Zhuang use with 
children is frowned upon by the common people or officials, whether they 
have attended a bilingual Zhuang-Han school or university, in which 
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languages they have received education, and whether they have attended 
Zhuang language classes at school.  
 Section C: language abilities – self-assessment of skills in Zhuang (speaking, 
listening, writing and reading with the choices of “very good”, “good”, 
“fairly good”, “bad” and “no skills”). 
 Section D: frequency of Zhuang language use in different domains (“at 
home”, “with relatives”, “at work or school”, “with friends”, “with 
neighbors”, “shopping”, “on the street”, “at the library”, “at religious events”, 
“with officials”, “in community events” and “other”).  
 Section E: language attitudes and desire to use language – whether the 
participant was encouraged to use Zhuang in childhood, whether they have 
tried to make their own children learn or use Zhuang, whether they agree with 
four different statements saying that Zhuang people should speak Zhuang 
language, whether they agree with four different statements about social 
interaction with Zhuang speakers, in which public language use situations do 
they think they should be able to use Zhuang language, whether they think 
Chinese law supports the use of Zhuang language, whether they think 
Chinese law hinders the use of Zhuang language, whether they know if 
language legislation has been translated into Zhuang, whether they know if 
legislation about Zhuang language education exists, whether they think that 
Zhuang language is useful in gaining employment, whether they know about 
people or official institutions conserving or developing Zhuang language, 
whether they have felt that using Zhuang language in life is more difficult 
than using Han language, and whether they think that Zhuang language 
development should receive official support. 
 Section F: public and private language use – whether the participant is aware 
of any recent language revitalization efforts, and which domains in their area 
see Zhuang language use (national parliament, police office, tax office, social 
security office, labor office, hospital, courts of law, government offices, local 
government offices, education, print media, radio, television, advertisements 
in public spaces, and advertisements in media). 
 Section G: Zhuang language media use (newspapers, books, plays, concerts, 
radio broadcasts, television programmes, music albums, films, websites, 
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email, text messages, social media, online games, letters, diaries, blogs, 
essays, lyrics, songs, poetry and other forms of performances). 
The EuLaViBar toolkit aims to assess the vitality and maintenance status of a 
potentially endangered language. The questionnaire examines language use in four 
different focus areas: capacity, opportunity, desire and language products. These four 
focus areas are further divided into four dimensions: legislation, education, media, 
and language use and interaction. Each focus area and dimension is connected to a 
set of relevant questions. Each question is scored according to the model explained in 
“Statistical Explanations of the EuLaViBar Scaling System” (ELDIA 2013B: 1–20). 
The scores of each answer varies by question and ranges from 0 to 4, where 0 stands 
for exclusive majority language use and 4 stands for exclusive minority language 
use. The scores of all the questions of each dimension of each focus area are added 
together and an average score is calculated, also ranging from 0 to 4. The numeric 
values of each dimension and focus area are then graphically represented in a polar 
diagram to give a clear idea of what the strong and weak points of the language’s 
vitality are. The higher the score, the more well-maintained the language supposedly 
is. Any additional questions that were added by the author to the questionnaire were 
not included in the calculations. The ELDIA Language Maintenance Scale is as 
follows (ELDIA 2013A: 3–5): 
0) Language maintenance is severely and critically endangered. The language is 
“remembered” but not used spontaneously or in active communication. Its use and 
transmission are not protected or supported institutionally. Children and young 
people are not encouraged to learn or use the language. 
 
→Urgent and effective revitalisation measures are needed to prevent the complete 
extinction of the language and to restore its use. 
 
1) Language maintenance is acutely endangered. The language is used in active 
communication at least in some contexts, but there are serious problems with its 
use, support and/or transmission, to such an extent that the use of the language can 
be expected to cease completely in the foreseeable future. 
 
→Immediate effective measures to support and promote the language in its 
maintenance and revitalization are needed. 
 
2) Language maintenance is threatened. Language use and transmission are 
diminishing or seem to be ceasing at least in some contexts or with some speaker 
groups. If this trend continues, the use of the language may cease completely in the 
more distant future. 
 
→Effective measures to support and encourage the use and transmission of the 
language must be taken. 
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3) Language maintenance is achieved to some extent. The language is supported 
institutionally and used in various contexts and functions (also beyond its ultimate 
core area such as the family sphere). It is often transmitted to the next generation, 
and many of its speakers seem to be able and willing to develop sustainable 
patterns of multilingualism. 
 
→The measures to support language maintenance appear to have been successful 
and must be upheld and continued. 
 
4) The language is maintained at the moment. The language is used and promoted in a 
wide range of contexts. The language does not appear to be threatened: nothing 
indicates that (significant amounts of) speakers would give up using the language 
and transmitting it to the next generation, as long as its social and institutional 
support remains at the present level. 
 
→The language needs to be monitored and supported in a long-term perspective. 
Regrettably, I was only able to translate the questionnaire into Putonghua, the lingua 
franca and dominant language of the GZAR. Providing a version of the questionnaire 
in Standard Zhuang would have been desirable, not least as a gesture of support for 
the language, but I was unable to acquire assistance from local contacts in time. 
However, there was concern that some participants might not be able to make use of 
the Standard Zhuang version of the questionnaire, as many young people are 
reportedly not skilled in reading or writing the language. Therefore, a Putonghua 
version of the questionnaire had to suffice.  
As mentioned above, I made some changes to the original ELDIA questionnaire. In 
some cases, questions specific to this study were added, and in other cases, some 
questions of the original form were left out. Also, some minor changes were made to 
the structure of a few questions to facilitate translation and comprehensibility in 
Mandarin, but these modifications should not have affected the quality of the data 
acquired from those questions. 
There were four notable additions to the original questionnaire. The first and most 
obvious one was to adjust the age choices in the personal information section. In the 
original questionnaire, the age choices scaled from 18 to over 65, but since this study 
aimed at studying the language use of young people, the choices were adjusted to 
range from 15 to 35 years, and divided into four age groups. Also in the personal 
information section, a question was added to inquire on the participant’s ethnicity, as 
all registered Chinese nationals are classified into one at birth. This is relevant since 
in many cases, people who no longer have any connection to the language or culture 
of their ancestors’ ethnic group may still be counted as belonging to said ethnicity, as 
for example in the case of the Manchu. In section B, a question about whether the 
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participant had attended a bilingual Zhuang-Han school at any stage of their 
education was added. This question was interesting, as it makes it possible to see if 
there are differences in attendance between different age groups. In section C, in 
question 26 of the original form, where the participant is asked whether they have 
attempted to teach Zhuang to their children, an additional choice was added, saying 
“if I will have children, I will attempt to teach them”. Again, for the sake of the 
young informants who do not yet have children, but would in theory be interested in 
teaching their children the language, thus providing more information on the 
participants’ language attitudes and perhaps also shedding some light on the possible 
future of the intergenerational language transfer. 
I made some omissions to the ELDIA form to make the completion of the 
questionnaire slightly faster. In the personal information section, the question about 
whether the participant had spent time abroad was left out. Questions 16, 17 and 18 
were omitted from section B, as language use with one’s spouse, children and 
grandchildren were covered by other questions to at least some extent. Sub-question 
40i was omitted purely due to human error, however. Luckily the question was only 
about the availability of Zhuang language computer software in the participant’s 
area, which presumably is not the case at the moment.  
Out of the total 38 replies gathered, 11 replies had to be left out from the final 
analysis. Out of these replies, nine were from online informants that stated their 
ethnicity as Han and judging by their answers, had no personal connection to the 
Zhuang language. Due to the anonymity of the online participants, I was unable to 
contact them for confirmation. The final two unusable replies were duplicates of 
existing replies. 
5 Analysis 
In total, I received 38 replies to my questionnaire. 31 were received through the 
online questionnaire system and 9 were taken during field work in the GZAR by the 
means of assisted questionnaire completion. In the end, 27 replies were included in 
the final data analysis, as 9 online replies came from people who seemingly had no 
connection to the Zhuang ethnic group or the Zhuang languages. These 9 replies 
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were used as control group for comparison in relevant situations. The age and sex 
distribution of the included informants can be seen in graph 1 below. 
 
Graph 1: Age & sex of survey participants 
As can be seen in graph 1, most informants were women. Only in the age group 21–
25 the majority were men. This age group is also numerically the largest, which 
reflects the author’s personal connections to university-age people. Continuing with 
the personal information section, 24 out of 27 informants stated their ethnic group as 
Zhuang, while three listed it as Han. The three Han informants who were included in 
the data analysis had used Zhuang language with some of their parents or 
grandparents, which indicates partial Zhuang heritage.  
All participants were born in the People’s Republic of China, and in 26 out of 27 
cases, in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. One participant was born in 
Jiangmen city of Guangdong province. The Guangxi-born participants’ birthplaces 
were spread out over most of the Zhuang-speaking part of the Autonomous Area, 
including cities such as Laibin, Guilin, Nanning, Chongzuo, Baise, Hechi and 
Qinzhou (listed in order of frequency). Therefore, the Zhuang-speaking participants 
can be expected to speak different Zhuang languages and dialects.  
All online participants, except two who did not provide relevant information, had 
moved away from their birthplaces. In 13 out of 18 cases, the current place of 
residence was outside of the GZAR, in cities such as Wuhan, Beijing, Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen and Hangzhou, and in one case even Japan. Out of the nine informants 
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interviewed during field work, eight were still living in their birthplace or its vicinity, 
i.e. within the prefectures of Chongzuo or Guilin. One informant had moved to 
Chongzuo from Baise city in the north-western part of Guangxi. 
There was a marked difference in education levels between the online participants 
and those who were interviewed in the field. 14 out of 18 online participants had 
attended university or vocational university and three had attended only high school 
or vocational secondary school. Among field work informants, seven out of nine had 
received only primary education, one had attended high school or vocational 
secondary school, and one had attended university or vocational university. 
A clear difference between these two participant groups also appeared regarding 
occupations. Out of the online participants, 15 were either working or studying 
outside of the home, two were working within the home, and one was unemployed. 
Among the field work informants, eight out of nine were working within the home, 
while only one was working or studying outside of the home. 
Based on their background information, the online participants and field work 
participants formed two quite clearly defined groups: one consisting of mostly highly 
educated people who had generally migrated out of Guangxi, and the other consisting 
in most cases of people with a basic education, living usually in or near their places 
of birth. The data gathered from these two groups will be compared in more detail 
below. 
13 out of 27 participants stated Zhuang as their only mother tongue, while five 
selected both Zhuang and Han, and six chose Han as their only mother tongue. In 
addition, one chose Zhuang and “other”, one chose Han and “other”, and one chose 
“other” as their mother tongue (see graph 2 below). This statistic shows a fairly high 
number of bilinguals from birth, 26 percent of the group. In comparison, there were 
only 11 percent of bilinguals in the control group. The number of participants 
selecting Han as their only mother tongue is notably high. Also, the low number of 
“other” choices can be interpreted so that most participants accept that their language 
or dialect is labelled as simply “Zhuang”. In a case like this however, where the 
ethnic group studied speaks several languages or dialects, it would have been 
interesting, and perhaps preferable, to leave the options blank, and have the 
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participants fill out their mother tongues’ names themselves. This change should be 
considered for the ELDIA EuLaViBar questionnaire form in the future. 
 
Graph 2: Mother tongues of survey participants 
It should be noted, that all field work informants selected only one mother tongue: 
eight Zhuang and one Han. This shows a marked difference with the online 
informants’ (migrant) group, out of which seven, or 39 percent, selected two mother 
tongues. This could have a connection with the state-level monolingualism of the 
PRC, in the sense that people who have the advantage of knowing Han language 
from birth, have a better chance at moving to the big cities where there are more 
education and job opportunities (for Han-speaking people). 
85 percent of the participants had learned Zhuang at home from parents or other 
relatives, and 48 percent had learnt Zhuang outside the home, from friends, 
neighbours, colleagues etc. (see graph 3 below). It should be noted, that only 11 
percent had attended a Zhuang-Han bilingual school or kindergarten (a question I 
added to the survey), and 11 percent had not learnt the language anywhere at all. This 
could be a sign of the low popularity of Zhuang language schooling, and a possible 
sign of some parents choosing not to teach their children Zhuang language, which 
would be an alarming trend from the point of view of language vitality. 
Once again, the country-side-dwelling field work informants showed a marked 
difference from the online informants: all of them had learnt Zhuang language both 
at home and in the community. 11 percent had also learnt it at school or class. Out of 
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the online informants, on the other hand, only 28 percent had learnt the language 
anywhere outside of the home, and only six percent had learnt it at school, while 22 
percent had not learned the language even at home. This would suggest that the field 
work informants have lived in an environment where Zhuang language use is 
common-place, while the online informants have probably lived in cities where the 
lingua franca has been Han, as is common (Yuan & Huang 2005: 65). This would be 
in line with the claim that the Zhuang language environment is more intact in rural 
communities. Also, the proportion of online participants stating they have not learned 
Zhuang at home is notably high. 
 
Graph 3: Participants' domains of Zhuang language learning 
Also in connection to Zhuang language learning, seven percent reported that some of 
their relatives or school personnel had tried to stop their parents from teaching 
Zhuang to them. In addition, 26 percent thought that some or many members of the 
common populace or the officials were against parents teaching Zhuang to their 
children. This would suggest at least some negative attitudes towards the Zhuang 
languages. This is further supported by the participants’ other answers in the survey. 
The participants very clearly expressed negative expectations about the usefulness of 
Zhuang in the labour market, as seen in graph 4 below. Depending on the question, 
only 11 to 22 percent of the participants agreed that Zhuang language skills would be 
useful in the job market. 33 to 41 percent thought it was difficult to say, and between 
41 and 52 percent denied any advantage received by knowing Zhuang language. 
These negative attitudes are probably linked to the fact that Zhuang language does 
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not play any significant role even in the society of the GZAR, and jobs, where 
Zhuang language skills are useful, are limited. 
 
Graph 4: Participants’ attitudes towards Zhuang language in the labour market 
Some of the most interesting data surfaced, when the informants were asked to assess 
their own Zhuang language skills. As can be seen from graph 5 below, 81 to 85 
percent expressed no skills in reading or writing Zhuang. This could be interpreted as 
failure in popularizing the Zhuang orthography created originally in the 1950s. This 
failure is likely to be caused by multiple reasons, including the lack of incentive and 
the lack of any functional role for the script in media or society. Also, the number of 
informants stating their Zhuang language speaking and listening skills as poor or 
lower was fairly high. 26 percent expressed poor or worse skills in speaking skills, 
and 22 percent in listening skills. The large number of “fairly good” (“hái kěyǐ 还可
以”) choices may have received a boost from the modesty of the participants, as this 
option is the standard self-deprecating answer in Mandarin for assessing one’s own 
skills. 
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Graph 5: Participants' Zhuang language skills self-assessment 
“At home”, “with relatives”, “with friends”, “with neighbours” and “shopping” were 
the only domains of language use where most informants used Zhuang at least 
sometimes (see graph 6 below). It is noteworthy, however, that even in these 
domains, the percentage of informants who used Zhuang “often” was relatively low. 
Among family and relatives, the percentage was at its highest, reaching 52 percent. 
The domains that saw the least Zhuang language use were “at work or school”, “at 
the library”, “at religious activities”, and “with officials”. On the absolute bottom 
rung was “at religious activities” and “with officials”, both of which saw any 
reported Zhuang use from only seven percent of informants. This shows a tendency 
in Zhuang language use to be limited into the private and local spheres. The more 
prestigious public spheres of work, education, religion and officiality were less likely 
to see Zhuang use. This data is reflecting the monolingual Putonghua/Han 
organization of the PRC state and public sphere, but also as a sign of ongoing 
language shift, as almost a half of the informants would not necessarily use Zhuang 
language even at home or with relatives. Meanwhile, the relatively low frequency of 
using Zhuang even with friends, on the street or while shopping may be caused by 
the lack of a Zhuang variety of wider use. Since friends or passers-by may come 
from areas of a different Zhuang variety or an entirely different language, it may be 
that communication happens in one of the local dominant languages: Southwestern 
Mandarin, Standard Mandarin or varieties of Cantonese (Yuan & Huang 2005: 65). 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Speaking Listening Writing Reading
Zhuang language skills self-assessment (N=27)
Excellent Good Fairly good Poor Not at all
49 
 
 
Graph 6: Frequency of Zhuang language use by domain (all participants) 
When examined separately, the mostly non-migrant field work informant group 
seemed to constitute quite a large proportion of the Zhuang language use of the 
general data (see graph 7 below). The field work informants were clearly more likely 
to use Zhuang at home, with relatives, with friends or neighbours, or at 
neighbourhood activities. However, even among this group, Zhuang usage was 
relatively low in the domains of work/school, friends, shopping, street, library, 
religion or with officials, repeating the same tendency of Zhuang being restricted to 
the private and local spheres. What is striking, is that even among these relatively 
vital language communities, Zhuang still saw very little use in work/school (two 
informants reported some use), religion (one informant reported frequent use), or 
when conversing with officials (also one informant reported frequent use). The 
domain “on the street” (在街上) also saw surprisingly low Zhuang use frequency, 
which may be due to an interpretation of “the street” as “the town” or “the city”, as 
strictly speaking the areas where the informants lived did not have streets, but merely 
roads or tracks. The reason for non-migrants tending to use more Zhuang in their 
daily lives may be a two-way relation: non-migrants may use more Zhuang, because 
they are situated in a more suitable linguistic environment, or it could be that they 
have not migrated, because their Han language isn’t good enough. The latter is 
possible, since it has been shown that minorities need to adopt the Han language to 
advance in society (Poa & LaPolla 2007: 341). 
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Graph 7: Frequency of Zhuang language use by domain (field work informants) 
Looking at intergenerational Zhuang language use, the data seemed to show a slight 
increase of Han use when moving towards the present (see graph 8 below). When it 
comes to the balance of Zhuang use versus Han use, a notable change can be seen 
when moving towards the present. In one extreme, the ratio of Zhuang use versus 
Han use was 2.5:1 in the case of the language used by one’s paternal grandparents, 
which changes to 1:1 when moving to the language used by one’s mother nowadays. 
In other words, Han use goes up in intergenerational contexts when moving towards 
the present, while Zhuang use goes down, both ending up at roughly equal levels. 
This kind of shift towards Han-Zhuang bilingualism has become a common 
phenomenon in China in recent decades, due to increased contact with the dominant 
Han ethnicity, and may result in Han language finally replacing the minority 
languages in question altogether (Poa & LaPolla 2007: 340).  
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Graph 8: Intergenerational language use (all participants) 
As many of the participants did not yet have children of their own, language use in 
this case was studied only in question 25, which required the informants to express 
their attitudes towards teaching Zhuang to their (in some cases) prospective children. 
If not wishing to teach Zhuang to one’s prospective children and not having taught 
one’s existing children Zhuang are labelled as having a negative attitude, and vice 
versa, then 41 percent of the informants had a negative attitude towards 
intergenerational Zhuang transmission, while 59 percent had a positive attitude (See 
graph 9 below). 
 
Graph 9: Participants’ attitudes towards intergenerational language transmission 
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Graph 10: Participants’ methods of teaching Zhuang to their children 
Looking at graph 10 above, it can be seen that among those who had tried to teach 
Zhuang to their children, the most popular methods utilized were all belonging to the 
informal and private language domains: organizing Zhuang-language activities or 
making Zhuang-speaking friends, encouraging the child to speak Zhuang to his/her 
parents, and speaking Zhuang to the child. Only one had enrolled their child in 
Zhuang-language classes, and no-one had enrolled their child in a bilingual Zhuang-
Han kindergarten or school. Neither had anyone used Zhuang-language books, films, 
cartoons et cetera as a language teaching method. The low rate of enrollment in 
Zhuang-language schools shown in the data may represent an equally low interest in 
formal Zhuang-language education in general, although in this case many of the 
children in question may still be below school age, and thus decrease the level of 
enrollment. The total absence of Zhuang-language cultural products such as books or 
films in this case may be caused by the simple lack of Zhuang-language products 
perceived interesting or useful enough, or by the difficulty of obtaining such 
materials. The relatively high level of disinterest towards transmitting Zhuang 
language to one’s children is likely to be connected to the perceived sense of 
“uselessness” of the language, which was already shown above in the case of the job 
market. This may be further supported by the fact that 59 percent of the participants 
stated that they had felt that using Zhuang language in different situations of life was 
more difficult than using Han language (see graph 11 below). 
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Graph 11: "Is using Zhuang more difficult than Han?" 
The increasing use of Han and the decreasing use of Zhuang in intergenerational 
contexts, combined with a large proportion of informants showing a disinterested 
attitude towards transmitting Zhuang to their own offspring, may indicate an 
increasing language shift rate in the future, posing a threat to the continued existence 
of the Zhuang languages. A larger study with a wider base of participants is needed, 
however, to make more certain conclusions about the situation. 
When it comes to the participants’ attitudes towards Zhuang language use in public 
domains, the data shows little support for Zhuang in most domains (see graph 12 
below). Only in the case of “television” did a majority of 59 percent support Zhuang 
use. In second place was “hospital”, although with the support of only 48 percent of 
the participants. In all other domains, those objecting outnumbered those supporting 
Zhuang use. It is interesting to note the low level of support for Zhuang use in the 
National People’s Congress and legal courts, even though national minority members 
are legally allowed to use their respective languages in government and court 
proceedings.  
This climate of negative attitudes towards Zhuang use may be caused by several 
reasons. One reason may be the efforts of the national government to make Standard 
Mandarin the national language in order to “modernize” the country and create 
national unity. Another reason may be poverty – Guangxi is one of the poorer 
regions of China, and this may cause people to connote the Zhuang languages with 
backwardness and poverty. This way, shifting to Mandarin may also be seen as a 
way of “catching up” with the Han. Third, Zhuang may also be thought of as unfit 
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for public domains, because of a lack of a prestigious standard variety, the 
popularisation of which was disrupted by the Cultural Revolution. 
 
Graph 12: Participants' attitudes towards Zhuang use in public domains 
When asked which public domains actually see Zhuang language use, only two were 
named by a majority of participants (see graph 13 below). “Hospital” was named by 
63 percent and “Regional government offices” were named by 52 percent of 
participants. “TV” came a close third, with 48 percent of informants saying there was 
Zhuang television programming available in their region. Hospitals are likely to 
stand out due to the possibility of many Zhuang-speaking elderly patients populating 
them. Meanwhile, regional government offices are likely to be populated by Zhuang 
cadres, who at least in the past have been known to receive an education that raises 
ethnic consciousness, which may translate into language proficiency (Kaup 2000: 
131–132). 
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Graph 13: Which public domains see Zhuang use in participants' regions 
The use of Zhuang language in different media was not very common among the 
participants, which is probably due to the fact that most of them claimed illiteracy in 
Zhuang. In all included media forms, most participants stated they never used them 
in Zhuang (see graph 14 below). The media that saw most Zhuang language use were 
“theatre or concerts”, “TV” and “music albums”, possibly because these are more 
easily available and require no literary skills from the observer. Traditional plays and 
music concerts may also be organized even in small towns from time to time. The 
yellow bar on the right side of the graph also shows that in all instances there were 
informants who expressed that the medium in question was not available in Zhuang. 
The usage of Zhuang in so-called modern media contexts, such as online games, 
social media, SMS messaging, email or other internet content was very rare. Out of 
these, social media was the most common, with three participants sometimes using 
Zhuang in its context. None of the participants ever read newspapers in Zhuang, 
although they should be available at least in the GZAR capital of Nanning. This 
indicates a low circulation, or that the state-run newspapers are not seen as 
interesting enough by the public. 
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Graph 14: Participants' Zhuang language media use 
Probably for the same reason as above, in other words illiteracy, most participants 
stated that they never use Zhuang language to produce literary works, such as letters, 
diaries, blogs, essays, lyrics or poetry (see graph 15 below). However, six 
participants stated that they use Zhuang for singing at least sometimes. Again, 
singing does not require one to be literate in the language. 
 
Graph 15: Participants Zhuang language text production 
All in all, based on these selected data, the situation of Zhuang language among 
young adults does not look promising. The limited domains of language use, the 
relatively high proportion of people speaking Han even in the domestic context, the 
negative attitudes, the challenging language environment, the high illiteracy in the 
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Zhuang script, the low responsivity to modern media and so forth indicate an 
ongoing language shift and a generally bleak future for the language, unless 
revitalization efforts are undertaken. In the following chapter I will introduce the 
general vitality score for the Zhuang languages among young adults based on the 
complete data I gathered, according to the ELDIA EuLaViBar model. 
5.1 Language vitality barometer for Zhuang language among young 
people in China 
In this chapter, a language vitality barometer score for Zhuang language among 
young adults in the PRC will be presented based on the European Language Vitality 
Barometer (EuLaViBar) model created by the ELDIA project, used in gathering the 
data for this study. ELDIA (2013A) created EuLaViBar for assessing the vitality and 
maintenance status of a potentially endangered language by measuring the speakers’ 
(i) ability and will to use the language at issue, (ii) chances of using it in public and 
private contexts, (iii) ability to develop it further, and (iv) ability and will to transfer 
it to the next generations (ELDIA 2013A: 3).  In the EuLaViBar, language use is 
examined in the following way as explained in ELDIA 2013A: 
“Thus, we must examine language use in different contexts, and factors 
influencing language use. In the ELDIA terminology, we speak of the following 
four focus areas: 
 Capacity: the subjective capacity, or, in other words, the speakers’ confidence in 
their competence to use the language; 
 Opportunity: the existing institutional arrangements (legislation, regulations at 
schools or workplaces, etc.) that allow for, support or prohibit the official and/or 
public use of the language; 
 Desire: the speakers’ wish and readiness to use the language, also reflected in 
their attitudes and in their emotional reactions to the use of the language; 
 Language products: products or services available in the language at issue 
(material or immaterial: books, papers, web pages, news broadcasts, concerts, 
plays, localised software etc.) and the demand for such language products. 
 
Across all four focus areas, or within each focus area, language vitality will be 
evaluated along the following four dimensions: 
 Legislation: whether there are laws which support the language at issue or 
multilingualism in general, whether the speakers know (about) these laws and 
what they think of them; 
 Education: all types and levels of education (both language classes/courses and 
the use of a language in education), people’s opinions, attitudes and feelings 
about education; 
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 Media: all questions relating to all types of media (traditional, electronic, social 
and interactive media), for instance: media use, language(s) used in media, 
minority issues in majority media, existence, accessibility, and types of minority 
media. 
 Language use and interaction: how the languages are used in communication 
and social interaction in different situations, with different people etc.” (ELDIA 
2013A: 3–4) 
 
For each dimension of each focus area, a numeric value was calculated based on the 
replies to the questionnaire. The replies were evaluated per the scaling system 
explained in detail in ELDIA 2013B (2–22). The scale ranges from 0 (critical 
endangerment) to 4 (maintained at the moment), and is graphically represented in a 
polar diagram designed by the ELDIA project. 
The data included in the calculations for the barometer include the answers already 
introduced in the previous chapter, as well as all yet-unintroduced data beginning 
from question 7 of the survey questionnaire. As an exception, additional questions or 
answer options included by the author into the questionnaire were omitted from the 
barometer score calculations. These include question 19 (“Have you received 
bilingual Zhuang-Han schooling?”) and one option in question 20 (“[I have learned 
Zhuang] at university/vocational university”). It should also be noted that the 
representativeness of the scores in the “language use” dimension is slightly limited, 
due to the omission of questions 16, 17 and 18, which were related to language use 
with one’s children and spouse. 
Graph 16 below represents the vitality and maintenance of the Zhuang language 
among the participants of the survey. Due to the small number and demographical 
limits of the participants, it should neither be taken as representative of the vitality of 
any single Zhuang language nor as of all the Zhuang languages in general. It should 
only be viewed as an indicator of possible minority language maintenance issues 
among young people born with an ethnic Zhuang background in the PRC. 
EuLaViBar scores are calculated based on a multitude of questions; this means that 
similar scores may result from different combinations of variables, and the results 
cannot be interpreted without background knowledge of the language situation in 
question. The EuLaViBar also must not be used for predicting future developments, 
or the fate of any individual language. 
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In graph 16, the four focus areas (capacity, opportunity, desire, and language 
products) are shown divided into the four different dimensions (language use, 
education, legislation, and media) marked by different colours. It should be noted 
that the “education” dimension is not included in the focus areas of “capacity” and 
“desire”, as per ELDIA’s design. The black lines indicate the calculated vitality 
scores – the longer the line, the higher the vitality. At the end of each line is the 
numeric value of the score. The graph is divided into four zones of a different shade, 
representing the different grades of language maintenance on the ELDIA scale – the 
darker the shade the more endangered the language, as explained below the graph. 
 
Graph 16: Language vitality barometer for Zhuang language among young adults 
 
 
 “Grade  Description  
0 Language maintenance is severely and critically endangered. The 
language is “remembered” but not used spontaneously or in active 
communication. Its use and transmission are not protected or 
supported institutionally. Children and young people are not 
encouraged to learn or use the language.  
1,82
0,73
2,08
1,58
2,16
3
0,17
1,46
0,331,22
1,58
2,3
1,22
0,32
© www.eldia-project.org 
This chart must never be used or 
reproduced without reference to 
the ELDIA project and the 
complementary quantitative and 
qualitative data. 
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→ Urgent and effective revitalisation measures are needed to prevent the 
complete extinction of the language and to restore its use.  
1  Language maintenance is acutely endangered. The language is used 
in active communication at least in some contexts, but there are 
serious problems with its use, support and/or transmission, to such an 
extent that the use of the language can be expected to cease 
completely in the foreseeable future.  
 
→Immediate effective measures to support and promote the language in 
its maintenance and revitalization are needed.  
 
2  Language maintenance is threatened. Language use and 
transmission are diminishing or seem to be ceasing at least in some 
contexts or with some speaker groups. If this trend continues, the use 
of the language may cease completely in the more distant future.  
 
→Effective measures to support and encourage the use and transmission 
of the language must be taken.  
 
3  Language maintenance is achieved to some extent. The language is 
supported institutionally and used in various contexts and functions 
(also beyond its ultimate core area such as the family sphere). It is 
often transmitted to the next generation, and many of its speakers 
seem to be able and willing to develop sustainable patterns of 
multilingualism.  
 
→The measures to support language maintenance appear to have been 
successful and must be upheld and continued.  
 
4  The language is maintained at the moment. The language is used 
and promoted in a wide range of contexts. The language does not 
appear to be threatened: nothing indicates that (significant amounts 
of) speakers would give up using the language and transmitting it to 
the next generation, as long as its social and institutional support 
remains at the present level.  
 
→The language needs to be monitored and supported in a long-term 
perspective.” (ELDIA 2013A: 5). 
The focus area “capacity”, i.e. the participants’ ability to use the Zhuang language, 
received a general score of 1.98, falling into the category of “acutely endangered”. 
The dimension with the highest score in this focus area was “language use”, with a 
score of 2.30, meaning that some groups still use the language actively, while its use 
in other groups is diminishing. The score of “legislation” in this case was 1.22, 
meaning that many respondents were unaware of legal support for Zhuang capacity. 
The media dimension got the lowest score of this focus area, a mere 0.32, meaning 
that respondents are not able to actively use Zhuang in media contexts. This is most 
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likely connected to the almost total illiteracy in Zhuang language among the 
participants, as well the somewhat limited opportunities to use Zhuang in media 
contexts. 
The “opportunity” focus area, which refers to legislation and regulations that support 
or hinder language use, was also labelled “acutely endangered” with a general score 
of 1.49. The dimension that scored the highest was “legislation” with a score of 2.08, 
meaning that language legislation is seen as quite supportive, but problems still exist. 
The dimension of “language use” came second with a score of 1.82, meaning that 
most respondents did not think Zhuang use was being actively obstructed, but the 
language environment did not favour its use, and efforts for revitalizing Zhuang were 
few. In third rank was the “media” dimension with a score of 1.58, meaning that 
opportunities for using Zhuang language media were scarce for most respondents. In 
the last place was the “education” dimension with a score of 0.73, as very few of the 
respondents had learned Zhuang in a classroom setting, and even fewer had received 
their education in Zhuang. 
The “desire” focus area got the highest general score, 2.01, barely reaching the grade 
of “threatened”. In this case “desire” refers to the people’s will and mental 
preparedness to use the language. The “legislation” dimension came in first place, 
with a score of 3.00, meaning that the respondents mainly viewed PRC language 
legislation in a positive light. “Language use” received a score of 2.16, which was 
largely due many of the respondents still having skills in Zhuang and using it in a 
family context, as well as having a strong wish for the language to be developed by 
professionals. However, the score was pulled down by limited language use domains, 
low incentive for the use of the language in public, partly negative language 
attitudes, and few efforts for revitalization. The “media” dimension received the 
lowest score of this focus area, only 0.17. The respondents showed little desire to use 
Zhuang in media or in text production. This is probably connected to not only the 
common illiteracy, but also to the lack of a prestigious language variety understood 
by everyone in the ethnic group, as well as the scarcity of Zhuang language media 
available. 
The “language products” focus area of the barometer refers to the availability of 
Zhuang language products and their demand. The general score of “language 
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products” was slightly below 1.00, but had to be rounded up, therefore placing the 
focus area barely in the category of “acutely endangered”.  The dimension of 
“media” had the highest score of this focus area, 1.58, which is still quite low. This 
means that the respondents thought that Zhuang language media is not very common, 
but it still exists. “Language use” followed close with a score of 1.46, which is 
caused by the respondents’ negative opinions about Zhuang language use in public 
domains, and their pessimistic view about the extent of Zhuang use in their country. 
In third place was “legislation” with a score of 1.22, also quite low, caused by many 
respondents being unaware of language laws being available in Zhuang. Finally, in 
the last place was “education”, with a score of 0.33, which is caused by Zhuang 
being rarely used as a language of instruction or being taught as a school subject 
according to the respondents. For example, only one respondent had attended a 
middle school with instruction in Zhuang, and none had studied Zhuang at 
university. Only two had attended Zhuang language classes. 
All in all, the barometer shows that among the younger generations born in the 1980s 
or later, Zhuang language falls into category 1 or “acutely endangered” in three focus 
areas (capacity, opportunity and language products), and into category 2 or 
“threatened” in one focus area (desire). These results undoubtedly indicate a 
decreasing trend for the Zhuang languages. Unless revitalization efforts are 
undertaken and the use of minority languages is encouraged in various fields, some 
Zhuang languages could be facing endangerment and eventual extinction in the 
future. The low score of desire for Zhuang language media indicates that the 
language attitudes of young people should be paid special attention to. Also, the 
capacity for media use was especially low, meaning that literacy in Zhuang should be 
increased urgently. The education score was also worryingly low both in the fields of 
opportunity and language products, requiring immediate attention. 
6 Discussion of results 
In this chapter, I will compare the results of this study with the theory and 
background introduced in chapters two and three. Notable results will be brought up 
for discussion and possible problems will be noted. All in all, the results of this study 
seem to support the hypothesis that, despite their size, the Zhuang languages seem to 
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be facing maintenance problems and their vitality level seems lower than would be 
desirable. 
First of all, the distribution of different mother tongues among the participants of this 
study seem to support the estimate that quite a large number of Zhuang do not speak 
the language. 30 percent of the Zhuang participants of this study selected other 
languages than Zhuang as their mother tongue, with Han language being the most 
common choice among them. This is quite close to the estimate of one third of the 
Zhuang population not speaking Zhuang, and this is only considering the question of 
mother tongue. If one were to include those that have shifted from Zhuang to Han 
after childhood, the percentage could be higher. Of course, the participants of this 
study do not represent the entire population demographically, but the proportion is 
still notable, especially when one considers that the urban areas of Guangxi are 
largely Putonghua-speaking. The proportion of monolingual Zhuang-speakers by 
mother tongue was also notably low, less than half of the entire participant group. It 
should be noted, however, that the set-up of the mother tongue question was 
problematic. In this kind of complicated language situation typical of the PRC, it 
would have been preferable to have the participants name their mother tongues 
themselves, instead of offering preselected choices. This way, the participants’ 
answers would provide information relevant to mapping the linguistic divisions of 
the speakers’ themselves. This change should be considered for any future studies 
using the ELDIA model in a similar setting. 
There seemed to be a marked difference in mother tongue and language use patterns 
between the online questionnaire participants (mostly urban migrants) and the 
fieldwork informants (mostly rural non-migrants). Almost all fieldwork informants 
selected Zhuang as their only mother tongue, while most of the online questionnaire 
participants selected either two mother tongues or Han as their only mother tongue. 
This is coherent with earlier theories of migrants being more susceptible to mother 
tongue replacement than indigenous populations (in this case the non-migrant 
participants). The non-migrants were also clearly living in a more intact language 
environment than the migrants, which could be seen from their higher number of 
Zhuang language use domains, and the fact that all of them had learned the language 
also outside of the home, while only less than one fourth of the migrant group had 
learnt the language anywhere outside of the home. This supports the claim that 
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Zhuang languages are safe mostly in rural villages, and highlights how the mass 
migration currently happening in the PRC poses a threat to the speaker numbers of 
even the largest minority languages in the country. 
The results of this study also align with claims of the unpopularity of Zhuang 
language education and the Standard Zhuang script. Only around 11 percent of the 
participants had attended bilingual schools and only 22 percent stated that Zhuang 
was used in education in their area. Illiteracy in the Zhuang script among the 
participants was staggeringly high, as over 80 percent declared they had no skills at 
all in reading or writing it. Illiteracy in Zhuang is undoubtedly linked to the low 
popularity of Zhuang language education as well as the rarity of Zhuang language 
media products available to the public. Many speakers considered Zhuang to be 
“useless” in the job market and society, which probably also plays a role in the 
unpopularity of the Standard Zhuang script, which is quite different from any other 
orthographies in the area, except perhaps Chinese pinyin. It is unclear to what extent 
the attitudes of Zhuang speakers towards the Standard Zhuang script have influenced 
its unpopularity, and this could be an interesting question for a future study. If 
speakers consider the script too strange or useless to bother learning it, it raises the 
question of why didn’t the original designers of the Zhuang script in the 1950s adopt 
some adaptation of a script already in use by other Tai languages, as was done with 
the Dai languages spoken in Yunnan. This would have at least carried the added 
value of facilitating the learning of other Tai languages. 
The participants expressed somewhat negative attitudes towards Zhuang language in 
society or among themselves. One fourth of the participants thought that members of 
the community or state/CCP officials were against teaching Zhuang to children. Only 
between 11 to 22 percent of participants thought that knowing Zhuang would be 
useful in the job market. Also, over 40 percent of the participants thought negatively 
about teaching Zhuang to their own children. Furthermore, almost 60 percent of the 
participants felt that using Zhuang in different situations of life was at least 
sometimes more difficult than using Han. Finally, television was the only public 
domain in which most participants wished Zhuang language to be used. All this 
indicates that (i) many speakers themselves may have negative attitudes towards 
Zhuang language, namely a sense of “uselessness”, and (ii) society may not actually 
be very supportive towards Zhuang language use. 
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The negative language attitudes are likely connected to Zhuang language not being 
granted a functional role even in the society of the GZAR, as explained in chapter 
three, and these claims were supported by the data I gathered. Zhuang language use 
by the participants themselves was most common in the domains of “home”, 
“relatives” and “neighbourhood”, while the public domains that saw Zhuang 
language use, according to a majority of the participants, were limited to hospitals 
and regional government offices. It is positive that these domains see at least some 
Zhuang language use, but what is worrying on the other hand, is that the usage rate 
was not very high. For example, in the cases of the “home” and “relatives” domains, 
only roughly a half of the participants selected “often” as the frequency of their 
Zhuang language use. In regards to the use of Zhuang language in public domains 
such as “hospitals” and “regional government offices”, only about 62 percent and 52 
percent reported any usage to take place. Considering that Zhuang variants used to 
function as local linguae francae not too long ago, all this would indicate that Zhuang 
language use domains are diminishing. Control of even the “low strata” of language 
use is possibly being lost to Han language, which would further increase the threat to 
the maintenance of the Zhuang languages. 
In intergenerational contexts, Han language seemed to be making an entry into the 
domestic setting of Zhuang families. When asked about language use with their 
grandparents, a clear majority of the participants stated that they use Zhuang. In the 
case of their parents however, Han language use became roughly as common as 
Zhuang use. Almost one fourth of the participants confessed in the survey to having 
poor or no spoken language skills in Zhuang, which is probably connected to a shift 
in domestic language use. Also, roughly 40 percent of the participants had a negative 
attitude towards teaching their own children Zhuang. All this would seem to suggest 
that there has been an ongoing decline in the intergenerational transmission of 
Zhuang among the age group of the participants, which could even be worsening 
among the current generation of children or in the future. A larger sample of 
participants would be necessary, however, for a more accurate view of the situation. 
The unpopularity of Zhuang language education was clear from the data. Only a 
fraction of the participants had attended bilingual schools themselves, and none had 
enrolled their children in a bilingual kindergarten or school. Only one had enrolled 
their child in a Zhuang language class. Neither had anyone used Zhuang language 
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books or films or any other language products in teaching their children the language 
at home. This is probably as much connected to the limited availability of these 
products (and the limited ability of the parents to use them), as it is to limited interest 
on the part of the parents, since only about one fifth of the participants wished that 
Zhuang language would be used in education. The same number of participants also 
stated that Zhuang language was actually used in education in their area, which is a 
notably low proportion. 
When it comes to Zhuang language media consumption, most participants said they 
never used any of the listed media in Zhuang. Zhuang language media does exist 
though, at least in the form of TV and radio broadcasts, music, drama and print, but it 
may be that they are not interesting enough, or that their availability is too limited. 
To get a clear picture of the reasons for such a low media consumption rate, the 
attitudes of young people towards Zhuang media should be studied, although 
illiteracy in the language almost certainly plays its part in the issue. Based on the 
data, Zhuang language also did not seem to be very responsive to the so-called 
modern media. Almost none of the participants used Zhuang language in social 
media, emails, online games, SMS messaging or other internet related contexts. 
Neither did almost any of the participants ever use Zhuang for any literary 
production. These issues are obviously connected to the fact that most participants 
were illiterate in the language. 
The language legislation of the PRC was mainly viewed positively and seen as quite 
supportive by the participants. However, as claimed by many researchers, PRC 
language legislation is not being effectively implemented, which is further supported 
by the results of this study. Three out of the four EuLaViBar focus areas ranked as 
grade 1 or “acutely endangered”, while one focus area was ranked as grade 2 or 
“threatened”, meaning that “immediate effective measures to support and promote 
the language in its maintenance and revitalization are needed”. 
Using previous research and the data gathered in this study, a comparison to the 
UNESCO language vitality assessment scale (UNESCO 2003) also shows that the 
situation of Zhuang language does not seem very secure. Only the factors of 
“absolute number of speakers” and “amount of documentation” are mostly positive. 
The factor of “governmental and institutional language policies, including official 
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status and use” is mixed, since especially Standard Zhuang receives support in PRC 
policy, but on the downside, language policies are not being effectively implemented 
and Standard Zhuang sees only limited actual use. The situations of the other six 
factors are mostly negative: intergenerational language transmission seems to be 
decreasing, the proportion of speakers on both the national and provincial level is 
small, language domains seem to be diminishing, there is little response to new 
domains or media, language education materials are few, and the community 
members’ language attitudes seem somewhat negative. Based on the limited data 
gathered in this study, it would seem that the situation of Zhuang as a whole would 
fit the category of “disappearing” in the language endangerment scheme designed by 
Grenoble & Whaley (2006; see chapter 2). However, this is only a small-scale 
preliminary study, and undoubtedly there are differences in the maintenance 
situations of each Zhuang language, which should be studied further in the future. 
There were some minor problems in the study typical of conducting an online 
survey, namely some inconsistencies in some replies. For example, 11 percent of the 
participants (three people) claimed to have attended bilingual schools, while only 
seven percent (two people) named schools or language classes as a domain for their 
Zhuang language learning. Most likely this is only a case of human error on the part 
of one of the participants, and in any case, does not change the fact that very few of 
the participants had attended bilingual schools.  
Another small problem in the questionnaire surfaced when the participants were 
asked to assess their own Zhuang language skills. A major part of the participants 
chose the option of “fairly good” (“hái kěyǐ” in Mandarin), which did not raise any 
suspicions until I observed some highly fluent Zhuang speakers choose this answer 
on my field trips. It became clear that many participants were possibly selecting this 
answer out of modesty, downplaying their language skills in the process. It may also 
be so, that the participants’ illiteracy in their mother tongue causes them to assess 
their language skills more negatively than necessary. Either way, it should be 
assumed that the participants’ spoken language skills may be better than the replies 
lead one to believe. Learning from this, a more suitable translation for “fairly good” 
should be used in future surveys. Although a simple improvement of translation may 
not be able to solve the problem caused by a wider culture of modesty. If a question 
was included where the participants were asked to name specific domains or 
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situations in which they have difficulties in using the language, and perhaps even 
select the degree of difficulty as well, it would provide more specific data on their 
language skills. 
A perhaps slightly bigger problem in the methodology was caused by the fact that the 
EuLaViBar questionnaire does not consider the special needs of handling data from 
both migrant and non-migrant participants. A slight majority of the participants in 
this survey had migrated out of the GZAR, and it is unclear whether these 
participants were answering some questions based on their experiences inside or 
outside the GZAR. This may have affected the data concerning for example language 
use domains. When looking at the data on language domains, it seems however, that 
most participants where answering based on their experiences inside the GZAR, as 
for example most participants stated that Zhuang is used in the hospitals in their area. 
In future studies with a similar sociolinguistic context, it would be best to modify the 
survey to fit both participant groups, or just concentrate either on migrants or non-
migrants for the sake of more accurate data. 
All in all, the methodology of this survey provided interesting results, and the 
combination of field trips and an online survey gave the data a bit more demographic 
variety. In the end, however, the number of participants is too low to form a solid 
picture of the maintenance situation of the Zhuang languages in general. What this 
survey does provide, however, is a preliminary view on the issue, which can guide 
future studies to address the most critical questions regarding Zhuang language 
maintenance with more accuracy and perhaps a wider sample of informants. 
7 Conclusions 
The objective of this thesis was to test the claim that the Zhuang, the largest minority 
ethnic group in the People’s Republic of China, are facing language shift and 
possible language endangerment. According to the data, there are indeed visible 
signs of language shift among young Zhuang – namely the diminishing language use 
domains, the spread of Han language into the home, and the increasing frequency of 
Han language use in intergenerational contexts. Also, through the examination of 
previous research, this study found that there is reason to question the official 
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taxonomy of Zhuang as a single language, a significant consideration for anyone 
assessing Zhuang language vitality in the future. 
This study was executed in the form of a 14-page questionnaire, which was 
distributed to young adults of Zhuang ethnicity born in the 1980s or later, between 
the ages of 15 and 35. The questionnaire was translated into Standard Mandarin 
Chinese from the ELDIA European Language Vitality Barometer questionnaire. 
Some changes were made to the original ELDIA questionnaire, including the 
addition of some Zhuang-specific questions and a decrease in number of questions 
related to the participants’ language use with their children, as many of the 
participants were unlikely to have children yet. These changes were considered in the 
final calculation of the language vitality barometer score based on the ELDIA 
method. The omission of some of the questions related to children proved 
unnecessary, as many of the field work participants actually did have children. 
This specific age group was selected because its members have gone through the 
education system at a time when tremendous changes have happened in PRC 
language policy, including a shift towards a monolingual Putonghua state and the 
emphasis of Putonghua even in the education of ethnic minorities. Being the 
generation that is currently or in the near future bearing children, they are also a good 
indicator of future developments in the trends of Zhuang language use. The survey 
was conducted by the means of an online questionnaire coupled with two field trips 
to two different rural areas of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in the spring 
and summer of 2015. 
A total of 27 usable replies were gathered from participants through the online 
survey and field trips. The participants of the online survey and the field trip 
informants formed two distinct groups based on their replies. The online survey 
participants had received a higher education than the field trip informants, and they 
were also more likely to have migrated away from their place of birth, with a slight 
majority migrating out of the GZAR. The field work informants were more likely to 
be monolingual Zhuang speakers by birth, and were more likely to use Zhuang more 
frequently and in a larger variety of language use domains. 
On a general scale, the results of this study support the hypothesis that the Zhuang 
languages are endangered or in the process of becoming endangered. The language 
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vitality barometer score calculated in chapter five was grade one (acutely 
endangered) for the linguistic focus areas of capacity, opportunity and language 
products, and grade two (threatened) in the focus area of desire (to use the language). 
When the results were compared to the nine factors critical to language maintenance 
as per the UNESCO language vitality scale (UNESCO 2003), the situation of the 
Zhuang languages did not seem stable either, since most of the factors scored 
negatively. A major single factor contributing to the problems of Zhuang language 
maintenance is undoubtedly the common-place illiteracy in the sawcuengh script, 
which was the case among the participants of this study. 
The results of this study are, however, based on a narrow sample of informants, and 
do not allow for wide generalizations. The results should be considered preliminary 
at best, and further study in this issue is required to produce concrete evidence of the 
endangerment of the Zhuang languages. A preferable course for future studies to take 
would be to concentrate on a single variety of Zhuang, while including a larger 
sample of informants. Another relevant research question would be the language 
attitudes of Zhuang speakers, especially concerning the unpopular sawcuengh 
orthography. In a language attitude study, one could perhaps also look at whether 
Zhuang speakers themselves consider different Zhuang variants to be dialects or 
languages, and draw a language map based on the experiences of the speakers. 
The endangered minority languages of the PRC are legion, and it may well be that 
the Zhuang languages will soon be counted among them. However, Chinese society 
is still very much in in the process of development and it is constantly undergoing 
tremendous change. A grass-roots society is yet to be formed, and this may be one 
reason for the still undeveloped ethnic identity among the Zhuang, which may also 
be a contributing factor in the problems that the Zhuang languages are facing. 
However, as China develops further and its people increase their quality of life, the 
growing middle class may eventually start developing a sense of ethnicity, once life 
is no longer only about survival. The urban Zhuang, who have opted for Han 
language and lifestyle, may once bump into a glass ceiling in society, starting a 
return to their roots. This process, while initially impoverishing a minority of their 
brightest minds, may result in a surge of ethnolinguistic movements, as the rejected 
minority elite re-enculturates itself and starts to cultivate an ethnic and linguistic 
identity separate from mainstream society, as Fishman (1989: 482) has described. As 
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of now, it is yet to see whether the Zhuang can form a united identity, be it Zhuang 
or Tai, which recognizes the importance of language to cultural heritage. Lately there 
have been also some positive signs from the side of the PRC and Guangxi 
government, which could be a sign of increased inclusiveness in society towards 
minority languages, such as the start of Standard Zhuang language testing in the 
GZAR, which hopefully will be further cultivated upon in the future. Considering the 
speed of change happening in China at the moment, however, I do wish that positive 
change takes place and a Zhuang identity is formed before the Zhuang languages 
become endangered to such a degree that revitalization efforts will prove near-
impossible. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Ethnic groups of the PRC by population 
1 Han 汉族 1,220,844,520  31 Sibe 锡伯族 190,481 
2 Zhuang 壮族 16,926,381  32 Kyrgyz 柯尔克孜族 186,708 
3 Hui 回族 10,586,087  33 Jingpo 景颇族 147,828 
4 Manchu 满族 10,387,958  34 Daur 达斡尔族 131,992 
5 Uyghur 维吾尔族 10,069,346  35 Salar 撒拉族 130,607 
6 Miao 苗族 9,426,007  36 Blang 布朗族 119,639 
7 Yi 彝族 8,714,393  37 Maonan 毛南族 101,192 
8 Tujia 土家族 8,353,912  38 Tajik 塔吉克族 51,069 
9 Tibetan 藏族 6,282,187  39 Pumi 普米族 42,861 
10 Mongol 蒙古族 5,981,840  40 Achang 阿昌族 39,555 
11 Kam 侗族 2,879,974  41 Nu 怒族 37,523 
12 Bouyei 布依族 2,870,034  42 Evenki 鄂温克族 30,875 
13 Yao 瑶族 2,796,003  43 Vietnamese 京族 28,199 
14 Bai 白族 1,933,510  44 Jino 基诺族 23,143 
15 Korean 朝鲜族 1,830,929  45 Palaung 德昂族 20,556 
16 Hani 哈尼族 1,660,932  46 Bonan 保安族 20,074 
17 Li 黎族 1,463,064  47 Russian 俄罗斯族 15,393 
18 Kazakh 哈萨克族 1,462,588  48 Yugur 裕固族 14,378 
19 Dai 傣族 1,261,311  49 Uzbek 乌孜别克族 10,569 
20 She 畲族 708,651  50 Monpa 门巴族 10,561 
21 Lisu 傈僳族 702,839  51 Oroqen 鄂伦春族 8659 
22 Dongxiang 东乡族 621,500  52 Derung 独龙族 6930 
23 Gelao 仡佬族 550,746  53 Nanai 赫哲族 5354 
24 Lahu 拉祜族 485,966  54 Gaoshan 高山族* 4009 
25 Wa 佤族 429,709  55 Lhoba 珞巴族 3682 
26 Sui 水族 411,847  56 Tatar 塔塔尔族 3556 
27 Nakhi 纳西族 326,295  Yet unrecognized group 640,101 
28 Qiang 羌族 309,576  Foreign-born nationals 1448 
29 Monguor 土族 289,565  Total 1,332,810,869 
30 Mulao 仫佬族 216,257    
Appendix 1: Ethnic groups of the PRC by population (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of 
China 2010) 
*Located on Taiwan and categorized into several different ethnicities by the Republic of China 
government. 
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Appendix 2: Standard Mandarin translation of the modified ELDIA 
EuLaViBar questionnaire 
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